

HEADQUARTERS
1st Battalion, 26th Marines
9th Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JJB/dac
5750
1 December 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines

Subj: Command Chronology: 1-30 November 1966

Ref: (a) MCO 5750.2
(b) DivO 5750.1
(c) RegtO 5750.1

Encl: (1) Command Chronology: 1-30 November 1966

1. In accordance with references (a) through (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.

D. E. Newton
D. E. NEWTON

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1/26

Nov 66

DECLASSIFIEDPART I: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

1. Reporting Unit. 1st Battalion, 26th Marines.
2. Location of Command Post. Vicinity Hill 55, DANANG TAOR, Coordinates AT 968617.
3. Period Covered by Report. 1-30 November 1966.

4. Commanding Officer and Staff

Commanding Officer		LtCol NEWTON
Executive Officer		Maj DONNELLY
S-1		2ndLt BOLEN
S-2		Capt JOHNSON
S-3	(1-13Nov66) (14-30Nov66)	Maj RATCLIFF Maj VAIL
S-4	(1-2Nov66) (3-30Nov66)	Maj DREBUSHENKO Capt BEST
S-5		1stLt MOONEY

5. Principal Subordinate Units

H&S Company	Capt CARLISLE
Company A	Capt VELASQUEZ
Company B	Capt SIMPSON
Company C	Capt KAPPELMAN
Company D	Capt WEIDNER

6. Command Section. 1-30 November 1966; OPCON 9th Marines with responsibility for Northern sector of the 9th Marines TAOR.

7. Average Strength for Month of November

Officers	USMC	32
Officers	USN	3
Enlisted	USMC	979
Enlisted	USN	63

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COMMAND CHRONOLOGY
1-30 NOVEMBER 1966

PART I: ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

PART II: GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DURING REPORTING PERIOD

PART III: SEQUENTIAL LISTING OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

PART IV: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

~~DECLASSIFIED~~PART II: GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS DURING REPORTING PERIOD

During the reporting period, the Battalion was responsible for the northern sector of the 9th Marines TAOR. This responsibility included the occupation and defense of the assigned sector from enemy attack; execution of offensive operations in the assigned sector; maintaining the Main Supply Route secure and open to traffic; establishment and maintenance of a reconnaissance network in the assigned sector; preparation to execute offensive operations beyond the assigned sector; and the support of pacification programs as directed. From 051200H to 191800H this command conducted Operation SHASTA, in this TAOR. A COUNTY FAIR was held in BICH BAC, AT 986635, from 16-19 November. At 300800H, Co B chopped OPCON to 2nd Bn, 5th Marines in support of Operation MISSISSIPPI. One platoon each from Co A and Co D were sent to take over the Co B AOR. Except for that stated above, enemy activity consisted mainly of sniper action and booby trapping, and friendly activity consisted of daylight combat and reconnaissance patrols and night ambushes.

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PART III: SEQUENTIAL LISTING

1. Personnel. During the period the Battalion had a slight gain in enlisted strength and, on 30 November, joined two Second Lieutenants O302. Losses are as follows: 59 Marine Enlisted and 1 Navy Enlisted transferred for duty. 1 Marine Officer, 1 Navy Officer and 54 Marine Enlisted transferred by service records while hospitalized out of country, 9 Marine Enlisted and 1 Navy Enlisted KIA, 2 Marine Enlisted DOW. Gains are as follows: 3 Marine Officers, 1 Navy Officer, 146 Marine and 5 Navy Enlisted joined for duty.

a. During this period the Battalion sustained the following WIA's: 1 Marine Officer and 54 Marine Enlisted. Of this number 15 Marine Enlisted were treated in the field and returned to duty.

2. Administration. The Annual Administrative Audit of Service records has not been completed in all companies as yet. Company "A" has 30 SRB's and Company "B" has 40 SRB's to audit to complete the program. These companies have been hindered by operational commitments and the dispersion of units in the field.

3. Intelligence. During the reporting period the Battalion S-2 had six O311's assigned to the Scout/Sniper Section bringing the Section up to T/O. The Battalion picked up two additional TPS/21's from 9th Marines giving the Battalion a total of four TPS/21's. One TPS/21 needed repairs and the others were being used in the following areas: Hill 1 (AT 980622), Ferry Site at (AT 929533) and at Hill 37 (AT 916582). The TPS/21 and its operators on Hill 37 were requested by III MAF and were sent to III MAF on 30 November. Of the Battalion's twenty infra-red scopes, four were turned in (the Battalion only rates 16), five need batteries, one has a cracked lens, and the remaining ten are in the Battalion Armory. The Companies had been using the infra-red scopes, but due to the necessity of continued recharging of batteries it was impossible to keep them in the company areas. The Battalion has one Starlight scope which is being used by 9th Marines at the present time. Three Snipers with M-1 sniper rifles are employed in the TAOR. There were 3 instances of contact with the TPS/21 and fire missions were called on the areas. The Scout/Snipers fired 5 rounds during the reporting period, resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf). Significant events during the reporting period are as follows:

a. Enemy Contact

(1) During the reporting period enemy activity in the TAOR was limited to harrasing tactics by squad plus size guerrilla forces. A detailed chronology of events is shown in the 9th Marines INTSUM's for the reporting period, and in the Operation SHASTA After Action Report.

b. Mines and Booby Traps

(1) There were four incidents of road mining. Two of these incidents were on Route 14 at AT 955584 and AT 945583. One was on Liberty Road North, AT 967598, and one on Liberty Road South, AT 926578. In each

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case homemade pressure type box mines were used with 26-40 pounds of explosive.

(2) There were twenty incidents of booby trapping of trails and buildings throughout the TAOR

4. Training. On the job training was conducted for all organic MOS's. Operational activities precluded any formal instruction. However, all newly arrived personnel reporting into the Battalion underwent a two day orientation period during which they were briefed by all the special staff sections, the Sergeant Major and the Chaplain. They also manned defensive positions on Hill 55 at night. Following this they were sent to the individual rifle companies and received another three days orientation and indoctrination before leaving the Company CP on patrol.

5. Special Operations. Operation SHASTA was conducted by this command in this TAOR from 051200H to 191800H November. See Operation SHASTA After Action Report for details. Also, a COUNTY FAIR was held in BICH B&C, AT 986635, from 16-19 November. See "Civil Affairs" section.

6. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Warfare. Nothing Significant.

7. Command and Control. LtCol D.E. NEWTON commanded 1st Battalion, 26th Marines throughout the reporting period. The Battalion remained intact under the control of the 9th Marine Regiment throughout the period with the exception of Co B which chopped OPCON to 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines at 300800H. Also, during parts of Operation SHASTA, this command had OPCON of Co G, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines, and Co F, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines. Co H, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines and Co E, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines were in direct support of this command for periods during Operation SHASTA. 1st Battalion, 26th Marines remains ADCON, 3rd Marine Division, OPCON, 1st Marine Division.

8. Communications and Electronics. Nothing Significant.

9. Close Combat. Nothing Significant.

10. Fire Support and Fire Support Coordination. Artillery was employed in various ways, including harrassing and interdicting fires, suppression fires in support of helicopter operations, and zone fire on suspected enemy positions. Targets of opportunity were fired upon and on call fires were used throughout the period, both offensively and defensively.

a. Artillery fired 58 missions against a known enemy during the period. Casualties from artillery during the period were reported to be 2 KIA confirmed and 21 KIA probable. One of the zone fire concentrations which was fired at night yielded a surveillance, made by a unit the following morning, indicating blood, bandages, pieces of uniforms and packs, and many sandals in the target area.

b. Three 81mm Mortar sections were attached to outlying rifle companies

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while the fourth was kept on Hill 55 in a general support role. Mortars were used extensively during the period against enemy troops and for H&I fires.

c. Artillery and mortar missions and ammunition expenditure figures for the reporting period are as follows:

Artillery observed fire missions -

105mm howitzer -- 25

155mm howitzer -- 33

Artillery ammunition expenditure -

105mm howitzer -- 3480

155mm howitzer -- 765

H&I concentrations -- 770

TOTAL 5015

81mm mortar concentrations -- 91

81mm mortar H&I concentrations -- 325

81mm mortar ammunition expenditure -

observed concentrations -- 1269

H&I concentrations -- 1421

2690

11. Logistics. During this reporting period, the Battalion supported the companies with a total of 256,500 lbs of supplies. The Battalions vehicles traveled a total of 3,736 miles in support of operations. In addition, 8 LVT's operated a total of 405 miles carrying 123,756 lbs of the total cargo and 625 troops in support of resupply operations. Resupply was disrupted by heavy rains which flooded the roads and washed out the ferry across the SONG AI NGHIA. The permanent displacement of two companies necessitated the preparing and construction of new company positions. Presently, both positions are prepared and construction is 50% completed for one company. This relocation and construction has been hampered by lack of construction equipment and material.

The recent completion of a Class 60 bridge across the SONG AI NGHIA should provide an all weather access to roads south.

12. Air Defense. Nothing Significant.

13. Combat Air Support. Air support was used by this command during the reporting period in support of ground units. A total of 50 Medevacs were flown bringing 59 U.S. casualties and 17 civilians to immediate medical aid. Of the 50 Medevac missions, 19 missions were of an emergency nature. 12 fixed-wing missions were flown in support of this battalion during the reporting period. UH-1E gunships were used as cover aircraft for the Medevacs and on occasion as strike aircraft. Six resupply missions flown in support of the individual companies were provided by UH-34's.

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14. Medical and Dental. During the reporting period, 716 Marines were treated at BAS, and BAS also treated 1020 civilians through MedCap. Eighteen battle casualties and 50 non-battle casualties were evacuated. Three hundred and sixty-one immunizations were given and immunizations are up to date for the reporting period.

The patient bunker has been completed and is located to the rear of the ward. A head has been constructed for patients and staff. The interior of the supply tent has been equipped with shelves for medical supply storage.

There was a difficulty in obtaining MedCap supplies. Less than 10% ordered was received and no more is expected in the immediate future.

15. Chaplain and Moral Welfare. Protestant coverage was given by the Battalion Chaplain and services were held on Sunday mornings and evenings and on Wednesdays in the Battalion CP, on Sunday afternoons in the Co D CP, and on weekdays in the other letter company CP's. Total Protestant services held was 24, attended by 612 Marines. Nine Bible classes were held for 63 Marines. The Battalion Chaplain gave an orientation briefing to newly arrived troops. In addition he visited wounded and sick at C-Med and WSA hospitals, wrote 19 pastoral letters to NOK of deceased Marines, handled 17 Red Cross cases and distributed over 1800 New Testaments and religious booklets. The Battalion Chaplain has also established liaison with an American Missionary who is doing occasional work in this TAOR.

Roman Catholic coverage was given by the 9th Marines Regimental Chaplain with Mass in the Battalion CP on Sundays and in the line company CP's on weekdays when possible.

16. Civil Affairs. Daily throughout the month, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines conducted a Medical Civic Action Program at Grid Coordinates AT 986610 in which the Battalion Corpsmen treated the villagers requesting aid. A total of 1460 civilians were treated throughout the TAOR during the reporting period.

A COUNTY FAIR Operation was conducted in the hamlet of BICH BAC, AT 986634. Walt Disney Cartoons were shown intermixed with propaganda films. A total of 150 villagers were treated through MEDCAP, and Catholic Services were held for the first time in the hamlet Church in two years. The village elders requested UMC aid in providing security for the hamlet and also requested help in constructing a school for the hamlet.

The resettlement project of AI DONG, AT 922565, took substantial steps toward completion during the month. The site was cleared, defensive positions were completed by the Combined Action Platoon, and the first structures were raised.

Propaganda broadcasts were made by the 4th HE team, 244th Psychological Warfare Company, on the 22nd, 24th, 25th, 29th, and 30th of November.

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Broadcasts were made between 1900 and 2100 from 3 locations each evening, from AT 974614, AT 970620, and 968612. The subjects covered includes, uselessness of the VC cause, the hardships of the VC cause, USMC and GVN aid to the people, hardships on the VC and the CHIEU HOI appeal. The target area was the hamlets surrounding Hill 55.

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PART IV: SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

- S-1 Journal
- S-2 Journal
- S-3 Journal
- NIF { 1st Bn, 26th Marines (9th Marines) OpOrder 117A-66
- 1st Bn, 26th Marines OpOrder 3-66

Added as Tab-A → After Action Report, Operation SHASTA

NIF { After Action Report, BICH BAC COUNTY FAIR

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0040667
18 FEB 1967

[REDACTED] Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

FIRST ENDORSEMENT on CG, 1st MarDiv ltr J10P:jgr, 3480, Ser: 00308-66
dtd 22Dec66

From: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
To: Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Attn: MACJ34)
Subj: Combat After Action Report (Operation SHASTA)

- 1. Readdressed and forwarded in accordance with reference (a).

Copy to:
MACJ2
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0/12 copies (see SHASTA)

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TAB-H

5-19 Nov 1966

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1st Marine Division (Rein), FMF
APO, San Francisco, California, 96602

3:0P:jgr
3480
Ser: 00308-66
22 DEC 1986

SECRET -- Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1)

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
Subj: Combat After Action Report, Operation SHASTA
Ref: (a) MACV Dir No 359-8
(b) FMFFMO 3000.4
Encl: (1) Subject Report

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b) enclosure (1) is forwarded herewith.
2. The successful employment of scout-snipers, paragraph 13a of the subject report, is considered noteworthy. The intensive scout-sniper training program now being conducted in the Division should achieve positive results in future operations.

H. NICKERSON, JR.

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1ST MARINE DIVISION, FMF

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1st Battalion, 26th Marines
9th Marines
3rd Marine Division (Rein), FMF
FPO, San Francisco 96602

3/JJB/wt
3100
24 November 1966

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From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, 9th Marines
Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report.

Ref: (a) Map DAI LCC, 1:50,000, Series L7014, Sheet 6644 IV
(b) RegtO Op Order 122-66
(c) Bn Op Order 6-66

End: (1) Operation Overlay, Operation SHASTA

1. Code Name. Operation SHASTA.
2. Dates of Operation. From 051200H - 191800H November 1966, inclusive
3. Location. 1st Bn, 26th Marines TAOR, QUANG NAM Province, DA MANG TAOR.
4. Command or Control Headquarters.

9th Marines

Col R. M. RICHARDS

1st Battalion, 26th Marines

LtCol D. E. NEWTON

Company A, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

Capt R. VELASQUEZ

Company B, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

Capt J. F. SIMPSON

Company C, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

Capt C. W. KAPPELLMAN

Company D, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines

Capt R. J. WELONER

Company E, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

Capt T. M. PRATT

Company G, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines

Capt BODCOWITZ

Company F, 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines

Capt G. A. DEEGAN

Company H, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marines

5. Task Organization.

1st Battalion, 26th Marines (-) (Rein)

LtCol D. E. NEWTON

Det. H&S Co, 1st Bn, 26th Marines

Company A, 1st Bn, 26th Marines

Company B, 1st Bn, 26th Marines

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Company C, 1st Bn, 26th Marines
 Company D, 1st Bn, 26th Marines
 Company F, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines
 Company G, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines

6. Supporting Arms.a. Artillery

1. Artillery units providing support for operation SHASTA were:

Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines
 Btry L, 4th Bn, 12th Marines
 Btry B, 1st Bn, 11th Marines

2. Missions were fired on preplanned concentrations, targets of opportunity, suppression fires in support of helicopter landings, fires on likely enemy locations, and H&I fires.

3. Ammunition expenditure during operation SHASTA was as follows:

Btry A (105mm howitzer)	--	2281
Btry L (155mm howitzer)	--	597
Btry B (105mm howitzer)	--	298
H&I fires (105 and 155mm howitzers)	--	<u>594</u>

TOTAL		3770
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4. Enemy casualties as a result of artillery were:

KIA confirmed -- 2
 KIA probable -- 19

5. One of the zone fires was directed at the reported location of a VC company. A search of the target area made the morning after the fires, revealed blood, bandages, pieces of uniforms and packs, and many sandals in the area.

6. Because of the density of the vegetation in the area of operations it was found that our best results were attained when utilizing air observers. Ground forward observers did an excellent job when calling missions in direct support of their units, but lacked the observation capability to call missions any distance from their location.

b. Air Support

During Operation SHASTA this Battalion received the following air support:

Close Air Support	12 Missions
Medical Evacuation	25 Missions
Troop Lifts	3 Missions

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Resupply	5 Missions
Spot/Observation	5 Missions

All Medical Evacuation requests were passed over the Tactical Air Request net to the direct Air Support Center. 12 of the 25 missions were of an emergency nature. The average time for completion was approximately 30 minutes with several taking longer when other circumstances were involved, such as hot zones immediately after two of the Medevac helicopters were shot down.

Only one of the Close Air Support missions was preplanned. This mission was requested through the Regimental ALO; the rest of the missions were of an immediate nature and were requested over the Tactical Air Request Net to the Direct Air Support Center. Two of the Close Air Support missions were flown by Huey gunships. Generally, target coverage was good. Reaction time for the immediate Close air Support missions was approximately fifteen minutes.

Close Air Support missions were quite effective when used. The number of missions, however, was limited due to the lack of availability of AO's and FAC's, and to rain and low ceilings which prevailed throughout the operation.

7. Intelligence.

Prior to the operation there were several reports from DAI LOC District Headquarters and other local intelligence sources that indicated one VC Company of varying strength, ranging from 80 to 100 men, armed with automatic weapons, and joining with one to two guerrilla units in the vicinity of GS (AT 9455), (AT 9456), and (AT 9556). The area of LA HUAN (1) (AT 9859) and DUC KY (1) (AT 9861) were known to be local strong points for guerrillas who operated against Liberty Road North and the eastern side of Hill 55. An estimated guerrilla squad reinforced with three man main force teams with sniper rifles were believed to be operating in each of these strong points.

At the commencement of this operation, it had been evaluated that the enemy would establish a delaying and harassing action with an estimated platoon plus. It was also anticipated that he could reinforce his unit with local guerrillas operating in the northern sector of the objective area.

During the operation, it was found that the enemy forces in the objective area were of multi-squad size. His coordination and fire discipline were considered excellent in that he only broke contact after we gained fire superiority. The enemy would then

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withdraw from the area leaving mines and boobytraps to delay our attack.

The area of operation is dominated by a flat poorly drained surface, crisscrossed with small streams flowing into the SONG AI NGHIA or the SONG THU BON Rivers. The land is devoted to wetland rice paddies throughout the plain with scattered stands of woodland and brush. Trafficability is fair to poor throughout the area. During heavy rains crosscountry movement is extremely difficult.

The roads in the area of operation, Liberty Road North and South, and Route 14 are dirt surface, dry weather roads. These roads require continual maintenance and are almost impassable during the heavy rain season.

8. Mission. 1st Bn, 26th Marines conducts search and destroy operations in assigned zone of action to kill or capture all enemy forces.

9. Concept of Operation.

Phase I. This consisted of a search and destroy sweep from the LOD on Liberty Road South up to Phase Line D. (See Enclosure 1).

Phase II. Phase II was divided into three subsections:

a. Continuation of the sweep from Phase Line D to the LOA. (See Enclosure 1).

b. A two company sweep from Company F's Blocking position, west into the DUC KY area. (See Enclosure 1)

c. Search and clear operations of platoon through two - company strength in the LA HUAN (1) and THUY BO (1) and (3) areas.

10. Execution. The Order was received by this headquarters on 4 November 1966. The rest of 4 November and the early hours of 5 November were spent in hasty preparations for the 5 November D-Day.

a. 5 November 1966. At 0900 the Command group departed Hill 55 for Co B C.P. AT 921547. Initially the operation began with two rifle companies and a Battalion Command Group. Companies B and C crossed the LOD at 1230. Company H, 2/3, came under direct support of the command at 1200. At 1230 they fired on 2 VC across the river, resulting in 1 VC KIA (Conf) and 1 VC KIA (Prob). Throughout the afternoon Co B destroyed one booby trap, 4 bunkers and one sniper's nest at 928554, and 2 bunkers and one 81mm round at 934548. Co B destroyed one more bunker at 934548. Phase Line A was reached by 1700 and the command group set in for the night

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with Co B at 936558. Co-C set in a perimeter at 938574. No enemy contact was made.

b. 6 November 1966. Units moved out at 0700 and arrived at Phase Line B at 0900. The command group moved to Co A's permanent CP, at 955554 and set up for operations. 1st Platoon, Co D moved into Blocking Position I. At 1050, Co C detonated a mine at 937577 resulting in one friendly KIA. Companies A, B and C moved out for Phase Line C at 1200. At 1230 Co C destroyed 2 bunkers at 943564, 2 at 945565, 2 at 946565, and 9 at 949573, for a total of 15. At 1330 Co B destroyed one bunker at 945566 and Co C destroyed a field of punji stakes VIC of 938582. The command group remained at the Co A permanent CP and all the maneuver elements halted on Phase Line C for the night. They were resupplied by Amtrac.

c. 7 November 1966. By 0700 1st Platoon Co D had moved from Blocking Position I to II. At 0800 Co G, 2nd Bn, 3rd Marines chopped OPCON to this command and began their lift into LZ Wren. Companies E and F, 2nd Bn, 1st Marines were moving towards their Blocking Positions IV and V respectively. Co F was in position by 0900 and Co G's helilift was completed at 1000. At 0820 Co E detonated a surprise firing device, at 944585, resulting in 2 friendly WIA's. They also received small arms fire from 001615, 000617, and 000619, and returned with small arms, mortars and artillery. Company F, in their blocking position took fire from the same area. At 1025, 2nd Platoon, Co D moving into Blocking Position III also received small arms fire from that area. At 1100, Co E still moving North to get into position received automatic fire from 977594 wounding one Marine. They returned with mortars and artillery. At 1035, with Companies D, F and E in their respective blocking positions, and Company C in a blocking position from AT 954596 to 953585, Companies B, A and G moved out for Phase Line D. At 1240 Co F received one round sniper fire from 955611 wounding one Marine. An artillery mission was called on the area. At 1330 Co D saw 5 VC run into house across river and fired (1) 3.5 WP round into house. Results: 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 1400 Co E received one more casualty from fire from AT 966603, and detonated a surprise firing device, AT 986585 resulting in one KIA and 3 WIA's. At 1430 Co G found and destroyed a series of steel spiked punji traps, 2 of which were booby trapped, AT 986588. At 1440 Co E AT 966608, received 50 rounds M-1 fire from AT 997604. They returned with small arms and 60 mortars. The action resulted in 1 friendly KIA and 1 WIA. At 1500 Co B destroyed bunkers at AT 966589 and 960591. At 1700 Co A received small arms fire from AT 975590 resulting in one friendly WIA. The Medevac Chopper also received fire from AT 992592. Co G received one more WIA when a man stepped in a punji pit at 1740 in VIC AT 992590. All maneuver elements crossed Phase Line D around 1500 and halted for the night, occupying positions in their respective zones of action, along the 59 E-W grid line.

d. 8 November 1966. At 0705 Companies B, A and G moved out towards Phase Line E. At 0720 Co G at 895690 received small arms fire from 987590, resulting in one friendly KIA. They returned with small arms and 60mm mortars, and in a subsequent search of the area, detonated surprise firing device resulting in five more WIA. At 0800 Co B blew an 81mm round in place, AT 961592,

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and at 0930 they destroyed two bunkers at AT 967599 967597. At 0930 Co E, AT 994596 shot and killed two VC (Conf), captured three VCS, and one U.S. Carbine. At 0900 Co A received small arms fire from AT 975596, resulting in one friendly WIA. At 1000 the Medevac chopper also received fire from AT 980597, 978600 and 985601. Co A returned fire with small arms, 40 mm, and two M72 LAWS but one more friendly KIA resulted. At 1100 Co C chopped OPCON to 9th Marines and was not reverted to 1/26 until 1600. At 1045 Co A destroyed two freshly laid "Bouncing Betty's, AT 973597 and 977599. By 1200 Co B had completed sweeping their zone and set up a blocking position from AT 966605 - AT 970600. Companies A and G had reached Phase line E. Late entry. Co E found the body of a VC they shot last night; 1 VC KIA (Conf). At 1245 Co G AT 968590 received small arms fire from their rear, AT 988588, resulting in one friendly WIA. They returned fire with small arms and an artillery mission, estimating 5 VC KIA (Prob). At 1315 the Battalion command group displaced to Hill 55. Co G at 1425, AT 990594 was taken under fire by approximately 5 snipers, wounding 1 USN Corpsman. They returned fire with small arms and an artillery mission estimating five VC KIA (Prob). At 1430 Co E shot one VC who later died of wounds. Result: 1 VC KIA (Conf). A document concerning a VC meeting was also captured. After Co G at 986586 received 5 rounds sniper fire from 988588, they called an artillery mission estimating three VC KIA (Prob). Co A, AT 983602 received 15-20 rounds of small arms fire at 1545 from 983599. They returned with small arms, 40mm, an artillery mission and a UH-1E air strike. The action resulted in three friendly WIA's, 2 of which were evacuated. All blocking positions held for the night and the remaining maneuver elements, companies A and G, held at Phase Line E.

e. 9 November 1966. At 0900 Companies A and G had reached the original LOA, and at 1000 Co C was landed in LZ Dove. At 0950 Co E at 996605, shot one VC AT 999606, but another VC dragged his body off. Results: one VC KIA (probable). At 1045 Companies C and F crossed the new LOD heading west into the DUC KY area. At 1200 Co E was released from it's Direct Support role. At 1200 Co B destroyed one bunker at AT 973606 and at 1205 Co F found a 15 by 15 meter cave, too large to destroy at 991610. It was camouflaged. At 1315, Co C detonated a surprise firing device AT 989616, wounding 2 USMC. At 1300 Co F detonated a surprise firing device AT 990613 resulting in 5 friendly WIA's. At 1400 Co B captured 1 male VC and 4 female VCS at AT 973606. At 1600 Co G detonated a surprise firing device at 987608 resulting in one USMC KIA and Co A detonated another surprise firing device at AT 985608 resulting in one USMC WIA. At 1615 Co A AT 987608 received small arms fire from 986606 wounding two USMC. At 1625 Co G also received small arms fire from 986606 wounding two more USMC. An artillery mission was called on the area. CAC-1 reported at 1930 that one VC Company was situated in VIC AT 950561. Zone fire of 105's was fired into the area that night. At 2015 the AN/TPS-21 detected 3 groups of people moving AT 981601, 974602, 972604. When one of the groups fired at friendlies, this unit fired 155's at target based on AN/TPS-21 location fix. At 2245 the ferry site over the SONG THU BON received two mortar rounds from 938554. They returned fire with 12 81mm rounds. At 2000 Co G chopped OPCON back to 3rd Marines.

f. 10 November 1966. Co A at 1000, AT 983602 received fire from one automatic weapon and five carbines from 985599. They returned with small arms, 81's and 105's estimating 6 VC KIA (probable). At 1615 a convoy on Liberty Road North was sniped at, wounding one USMC engineer. At 1430 Co F chopped OPCON back to 1st Marines and both Co C and Co F were extracted by helicopter. Company D left it's blocking position, and Companies A and B walked to Hill 55.

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g. 11 November 1966. At 0345 1st Plt, Co B, at SONG THU BON ferry site, AT 925538 received two incoming mortar rounds. At 1015, a platoon patrol from Co C AT 975591 received two rounds sniper fire from 982594 resulting in one WIA. They returned with 81's and 106's. At 1200, Co C destroyed a mine at AT 954594. It was stored in the rafters of a house. At 1545 Co C apprehended one female VCS at AT 967597. She had 5160 piasters and no ID card. At 2005 one grenade was thrown into the Co-C-CP.

h. 12 November 1966. At 1225, Hill 55, AT 962609, received 4-5 60mm Mortar rounds or rifle grenades, wounding three USMC from Co D and five USMC from Amtracs. Hill 5 also received 12-15 rounds of automatic fire. They returned with 81's. At 0430 one platoon of Co D and two tanks were sent to 1st Marines as a reaction force. At 0805 Co C, AT 963592 received fire from 2 VC, AT 962594. They returned with small arms and two rounds of 81mm and saw one VC fall. Later they apprehended one male without an ID card in the area. Results: 1 VC KIA (probable) and 1 VCS. At 1815 Co A detonated a surprise firing device, AT 973587 resulting in one USMC KIA (DOW) and one WIA. At 0930 S-2 with one rallier destroyed one tunnel, at 967601. At 2005 the AN/TPS-21 detected 10-12 VC, AT 988620. 81's were fired into the area. No movement was detected after that.

i. 13 November 1966. At 0135 on Hill 55 a figure tripped a flare at 961611 and ran off under pursuing 30 Caliber fire from the Tank Co. At 0745 the road sweep detail, at 966601, received sniper fire from 969601 and returned with small arms and 106's. At 1220 a civilian showed a Co D patrol a VC sniper position at AT 935607. The patrol found 9mm cartridges and destroyed the position.

j. 14 November 1966. Co C began a Company sized search and destroy in the THUY BO - LA HUAN area. At 0645 they received automatic fire from AT 983592 and at 0705 from AT 976592 wounding 1 USMC. At 0720 the same man was hit again, AT 976591. The Medevac coming in crashed at 0820, AT 976591, when hit by automatic fire. The pilot was hit by one round. At 0900 the second Medevac chopper was hit from AT 982594, but it managed to pick up the casualties and fly out again. Artillery fire was called on VIC AT 983593, destroying 10 structures, damaging 5, and destroying 3 automatic weapons positions and a trench line. At 1125 Co C received one more USMC WIA from sniper fire. At 1515, as the maintenance crew for the original downed UH-34 landed in the area, a covering UH-1E was hit and crashed at AT 981595. Just previous to this two scout/sniper teams at AT 980592 and 981591 shot and killed four VC (confirmed) at AT 983594. After the crash two artillery missions and an air strike were called on the area from LA HUAN (1) and THUY BO (1) east to the tracks. At 2130 CAC-1 AT 922563 heard VC shouting Anti-American words from VIC AT 917558, and called a 105 mission.

k. 15 November 1966. At 0300 Co C, AT 978592 observed 3 VC approach lines and throw three grenades. Co C returned with ten rounds small arms and 4 rounds M79. A search the next day revealed one VC KIA (confirmed) and the capture of one Chinese Communist grenade, 52 rounds of .30 cal and (2) 30 round carbine clips. One additional VC KIA (probable) is estimated. At 0930 Co D detonated a shaped charge mine rigged as a surprise firing device at AT 985594. This resulted in three friendly KIA's and 2 WIA's, all from a platoon of Co A which was attached to Co D. At 1000 Co D destroyed

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ten bunkers, VIC AT 986584. At 1200 Co D received 5 rounds of sniper fire from AT 993598 resulting in one friendly KIA (DOW). They returned with 12 rounds M79, 50 rounds 7.62MG, 75 rounds 7.62. At 1300 Co D AT 988598 received another 30 rounds of small arms fire from AT 988599 wounding one more USMC. They returned with 100 rounds 7.62MG and 15 rounds M79.

l. 16 November 1966. At 0040 Hole 2 received a few rounds of harrasing fire. Hole 3 saw the muzzle flashes and fired ten rounds of 7.62 and heard a moan afterwards. At 0150 Headquarters Company on Hill 55 received fire from in front of their position and returned with one 106 round. The rest of the day was quiet until 1800 when VC snipers began firing at the Artillery and Headquarters Company sectors of Hill 55 from the tree line VIC AT 960623. It was returned with small arms, 106's 81's and artillery.

m. 17 November 1966. At 1010, as Co D was moving out of the LA HUAN (1)/ THUY BO (1) area, they spotted about 15 VC moving into their previous position, AT 983595 Co D was almost completely ferried across the river at AT 983593 when this happened. They fired small arms, 60mm and a 155 mission. The action resulted in 3 friendly WIA's, 3 VC KIA's (confirmed) and 7 VC KIA's (probable). That night from 2000 - 2400, Hill 55 was subjected to various perimeter probes. Also an intelligence report rated "B-1" was received that one VC Company was located in VIC AT 938575, 945577, 942569 and another in VIC AT 931533 and 939554. Zone fire with the 105 Battery and the 155 Battery was delivered on the area.

n. 18 November 1966. A search of last night's zone fire revealed much blood and bandages plus torn fragments from uniforms, packs and many sandals in the area. At 1130 Co D apprehended 1 male VCS in a hut AT 948608 containing one set of black khakis, one spent carbine round and one tube of penicillin. At 1700 Co C CP received 6-8 rounds of sniper fire from 573588. They returned with small arms, 60mm, and a close air strike. An estimate of four VC KIA (probable) was made.

o. 19 November 1966. At 1000 Co C AT 974590 destroyed in place what had appeared to be a "Bouncing Betty" mine. However, the force of the blast revealed it to be a booby trapped 105 round. One USMC WIA resulted and one VCS was apprehended. Co D went down into the GIANG LA (1) and (2) and LA HUAN (1) area around 1200. At 1445 Co D, AT 982604 received about 250 rounds small arms fire and 6 rounds 60mm from AT 987604. They returned fire with 7.62, M79, M60 and M72 LAAWS, as well as 7 90mm rounds from a tank and a Close Air Support Mission. Total results for the action were one friendly KIA and six WIA, and 5 VC KIA (confirmed). Artillery also fired a destruction mission on AT 978597, destroying 8 structures, damaging 5, and destroying one bunker and two tunnels.

Operation SHASTA Terminated at 1800.

11. Results.

- a. Friendly personnel losses: 13 KIA, 66 WIA, 20 non-battle casualties.
- b. Friendly equipment losses: None.

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c. Enemy Casualties: 22 KIA (Conf), 43 KIA (Prob) 2 VCC, 10 VCS.

d. Enemy Equipment Losses.

(1) Structures

Bunkers - 29
Tunnels - 3
Huts - 19

(2) Weapons

1 US Carbine .30 Cal
1 Chinese Communist Grenade

12. Administration Matters. A logistics annex was issued with the operation order. This annex effectively supported the entire operation.

a. Supply

(1) The prescribed load for troops was three meals MCI, two canteens water and a BA of ammunition. This load proved adequate and allowed the companies to operate through the next day before resupply was necessary.

(2) Resupply was effected by helicopters, LVTP-5's, M-79 Otters, and trucks from Hill #55. All resupply was effected on time except on one occasion where the helicopters were not available. On that occasion the two companies affected were resupplied the next day.

b. Maintenance. No problems in the maintenance area were encountered.

c. Treatment of Casualties and Evacuation. All casualties were initially treated in the field by company corpsmen. Those casualties requiring further treatment were helilifted to 3rd Medical Battalion or trucked to the Battalion Aid Station on Hill #55.

d. Transportation. Although no organic transportation was utilized during the operation, LVTP-5's, M-54 Trucks, and M-76 Otters were used in evacuation of casualties and in resupply. The transportation support received was excellent and no problems were encountered.

e. Communication.

(1) During Operation Shasta, the forward Bn. C.P. had three radio nets activated; Bn. Tac 1, Bn. Tac 2 and the Regimental Tac Net. During the first three days of the operation, Bn. Tac 2 carried the majority of the traffic (182 written msgs.), with Bn. Tac 1 handling 55 and the Regimental Tac Net handling 38 written messages. Of these messages, 36 were Spot-reps and 148 were Sit-reps. As the Regimental Hqs. did not desire that our Sit-reps and Spot-reps be sent to them over the Regt. Tac Net, many of the messages required double processing through our tactical nets. The duplicate processing does not reflect in the total number of messages sent over our nets.

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(2) As all equipment utilized by the Command Group had to be back-packed, the amount of communications equipment taken with the forward C.P. group was governed by the availability of communications personnel. The necessity of maintaining two separate C.P.'s required that the communications system for each C.P. be manned by a minimum number of communicators.

f. Medical Evaluation. Assigned medical personnel were sufficient to treat all casualties. No problems were encountered in the availability of medical supplies.

13. Special Equipment & Techniques.

a. During Operation SHASTA 2 Sniper rifles were taken from the Rifle Companies per section and placed in the hands of the Bn. Scouts. The Scouts were divided into two groups of 4, with 1 sniper rifle in each group. Each group was instructed in the proper means of sniping, utilizing an observer range cards, log and local security. With no more instruction than this they were deployed for 3 days with a rifle company. During this time the two rifles fired a total of 5 rounds resulting in 4 VC KIA (Conf).

b. Due to Operation SHASTA's boundaries which generally conformed to our TAOR the Bn's TPSY/21's were employed throughout the operation without having to move them from their normal location. The TPSY's were used to locate targets after the hours of darkness and in excess of 1,000 meters from their location. Specific targets were group movement and the most profitable employment was to plot supporting arms fire in advance of the moving target once a likely route was established. In every case the locations of friendly units was doubled checked against the location of the moving target picked up by the TIPSY.

14. Commanders Analysis. There were no divergences from accepted doctrine during the course of this operation. Of particular note were the following:

a. Assimilation of Company G, 2/3 and Companies E and F of 2/1 into the operation. The Commanding officers of these units were briefed on their missions at 1700 on D+1 and executed these missions on D+2 in an extremely satisfactory manner. The short planning time and quick reaction of these units during Operation SHASTA testifies to the professionalism of the Commanders and the Units themselves.

b. The excellence of fire support coordination at all levels. The scheme of maneuver provided for an ultimate convergence of forces which as the operation progressed decreased the area for employment of supporting arms. Fires were delivered in significant volume, accurately and safely through the end of the operation, confirming the adequacy of Coordination doctrine.

c. Communications were outstanding throughout the operation providing for effective command and control at all levels. The effectiveness of the AN/PRC-25 radio was further demonstrated during Operation SHASTA and was the basis for the effectiveness of Communications.

15. Recommendations. None.

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