

HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1-26
c/o FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

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Ser: 003A268
3/PDR/ges
5750
26 September 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)

Subj: Command Chronology

Ref: (a) NCO 5750.2
(b) BrigOrder 5750.1
(c) CO, SLF ltr ser 5750 of 30Aug66

Encl: (1) BLT 1-26 Command Chronology for the period 1-26 September 1966.

1. In compliance with references (a), (b) and (c), enclosure (1) is submitted.
2. This chronology includes all pertinent and significant information as defined in reference (a).

A. A. Monti
A. A. MONTI

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BLT 1-26 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (PART I)

1. The following organizational data is submitted.

a. Designation. Battalion Landing Team 1-26

b. Composition

(1) 1-26 September 1966

1st Bn, 26th Marines

Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Marines

107mm Mortar Btry, 2d Bn, 12th Marines

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SP Bn

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Amtrac Bn

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Tk Bn

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Recon Bn

Det, Hq Co RL-26

Logistic Support Unit

Det, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn

Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med Bn

Det, 15th Dental Co, FMF

1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon Co

c. Locations

(1) 1-14Sep66 - embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28).

(2) 15-25Sep66 - Republic of Vietnam. See BLT 1-26 After Action Report for DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE.

(3) 26Sep66 - embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2), the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) and the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28). Disembarked at Danang, Republic of Vietnam.

d. Period covered by this report. 1-26 September 1966.

2. Personnel

a. Average Monthly Strength:

1) USMC: Officer 65
Enlisted 1543
(2) USN: Officer 8
Enlisted 90

b. Personnel Assignments/Attachments

(1) Commanding Officer		LtCol A. A. MONTI
(2) Executive Officer		Major T. E. DONNELLY
(3) S-1		2ndLt G. E. BOLEN
(4) S-2		Capt J. S. VOGT
(5) S-3	(1-12Sep66)	Major P. D. RATCLIFF
	(13-18Sep66)	Capt J. F. HANSSTON
	(19-26Sep66)	Major P. D. RATCLIFF
(6) S-4		Capt W. DREBUSHENKO
(7) CO, H&S Co	(1-12Sep66)	Capt R. P. CARLISLE
	(13-18Sep66)	Capt A. L. REYNOLDS
	(19-26Sep66)	Capt R. P. CARLISLE
(8) CO, Co A		Capt R. VELASQUEZ
(9) CO, Co B	(1-22Sep66)	Capt J. F. SIMPSON
	(23-24Sep66)	Capt J. F. HANSSTON
	(25-26Sep66)	Capt J. F. SIMPSON
(10) CO, Co C		Capt C. W. KAPPELMAN
(11) CO, Co D		Capt R. J. WEIDNER
(12) CO, Btry A, 1-13		Capt R. W. BAILEY
(13) CO, 107mm Mortar Btry, 2-12		Capt R. O. MERRITT
	(1-26Sep66 Acting)	1stLt W. J. ODLE
(14) FltCmdr, 1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon Co		Capt K. D. JORDAN

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- (15) PltCdr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn
(1-15Sep66) 1stLt W. J. SPAINHOUR JR.
(16-26Sep66) Sgt R. C. SOMMER
- (16) PltCdr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Engr Bn 2ndLt E. C. DEAR
- (17) PltCdr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th AT Bn 1stLt J. C. DEBILIO
- (18) PltCdr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Amtrac Bn 1stLt W. J. DIBELLO
- (19) PltCdr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Tk Bn 1stLt R. L. LARKIN
- (20) PltCdr, 1st Plt, Co A, 5th SP Bn Capt D. L. ANDERSON
- (21) Logistic Support Unit Capt J. L. MARABLE
- (22) DetCdr, Det, Co A, 5th Med Bn Lt (USN) S. C. SMITH,
JR (MC)
- (23) DetCdr, Det, 15th Dental Co Lt (USN) J. L. DUGAN (DC)
- (24) DetCdr, Det, HqCo, RLT-26 1stLt J. V. MOORE
- (25) Det Cdr, Det, CommSpt Co, 9th Comm Bn Sgt R. V. THOMPSON

3. Intelligence. There were no significant items concerning intelligence during the reporting period except for Operation DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE. This period is covered in detail in the BLT 1-26 After Action Report for the above operation.

4. Training. During the in-port period at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands, (3-12Sep66) the BLT concentrated on upkeep and repair of equipment, physical conditioning and firing of tanks and ONTOS which had not been landed during DECKHOUSE III Phase I and II/Operation TOLEDO.

5. Command Control. This command encountered no problems in this area although BLT 1-26 was chopped to III MAF during DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE. The transition was smoothly executed and communications were established with 4th Marines with no difficulty. See BLT 1-26 After Action Report of above operation for details.

6. Special Operations. During the period 15-25Sep66 the BLT participated in Operation DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE in the Republic of Vietnam. See BLT 1-26 After Action Report for the above operation for details.

BLT 1-26 COMMAND CHRONOLOGY (PART II)

ENCL:

- NIF?* 1. SLF Msg 111544ZSep66 (FragOrder #1 for DECKHOUSE IV)
2. After Action Report of BLT 1-26 for DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE. 15-24 Sep 66
3. OpO # 328-67, DECKHOUSE II, 11 Sep 1966. (SAC #298 352)

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HEADQUARTERS
Battalion Landing Team 1-26
a/o. FPO, San Francisco, California 96602

STR: 003B269
3/PDR/dac
26 September 1966

From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Special Landing Force (CTG 79.5)

Subj: Combat After Action Report for Operation DECKHOUSE IV/PRAIRIE

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 Operation Plan 328-67
(b) BLT 1-26 Operation Order 328-67
(c) Maps: AMS L7014 - 6342 I (1:50,000) CAM-LO
AMS L7014 - 6442 IV (1:50,000) QUANG TRI

Encl: (1) Report of Operation DECKHOUSE IV/PRAIRIE
Tab (c) Operation Overlay for Operation DECKHOUSE IV
Tab (b) Operation Overlay for Operation PRAIRIE

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following report is submitted. For all grid coordinates refer to reference (c).

2. Operation DECKHOUSE IV was an amphibious operation utilizing surface and helicopterborne assault forces. Operation PRAIRIE was a continuation of operations ashore in conjunction with the 4th Marine Regiment (Rein).

3. D-day for this operation was 15 September 1966. DECKHOUSE IV terminated at 1200H 18 September 1966 when BLT 1-26 chopped OpCon from TG 79.5 to the 4th Marines to participate in Operation PRAIRIE. Operation PRAIRIE terminated for BLT 1-26 at 1200H 24 September 1966 when BLT 1-26 chopped OpCon to TG 79.5. The tactical amphibious withdrawal was completed at 1500H 25 September 1966.

4. The target area for Operation DECKHOUSE IV/PRAIRIE was the northeastern portion of GIA LINH District of QUANG TRI Province, I Corps Area. The terrain of the coastal region is flat and relatively open while to the west small rolling hills and heavy vegetation predominate.

5. The BLT 1-26 Command Post displaced ashore, by helicopter, to YD 197694 at 1015H. At 1414H on 18 September 1966, the Command Post displaced to YD 142639. The Command Post remained at this location until the termination of the operation.

6. Administrative Matters

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a. Logistics

(1) Helicopter Support

(a) Effects of troop lifts upon resupply.

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DECKHOUSE IV PRAIRIE

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1 D-day. During the first day of DECKHOUSE IV troop lifts by helicopter were heavy. Three companies and the 107mm Howtar Battery were moved from ship to shore. One company was lifted a second time later in the day. Additional helicopters were employed for 2½ hours in extracting the Recon Platoon under heavy enemy fire. The heavy use of helicopters delayed resupply and for some units resupply was not completed. The movement of one company the second time was caused by the entrapment of the Recon Platoon.

2 Operation after D-day. After D-day, resupply by helicopter was satisfactory overall.

(b) Problems created by the lack of helicopters.

1 On D+3 operation control of BLT 1-26 was passed to CO 4th Marines. Control of the helicopter squadron was passed to CO MAG 16. Logistical support affected immediately. Helicopter availability was drastically reduced. Uncertainty of helicopter availability caused stockpiling in some units. Tactical movements were affected by the lack of timeliness of helicopters; i.e., units were tied to their water cans and departures toward objectives were frequently delayed. Helicopters were generally not available to resupply units after 1700 unless on an emergency basis. Urgent and frequent calls were made to insure availability of helicopters for the purposes of resupply. At least one company each day was not resupplied, primarily because of darkness. It must be pointed out that resupply problems were compounded by continuous air strikes, naval gunfire, and artillery missions. Whenever helicopters were available, they were frequently diverted or returned without resupply being completed. A portion of the helicopter problem was simply a matter of adjusting to the policy and use of helicopters locally employed. For all practical purposes, it appeared that missions were allocated equally among battalions without recognizing the fact that helicopter requirements for the BLT were greater. Emergency Med-evacs never were considered as a problem.

2 Shore Party operations. On D+3, Shore Party established a logistics support area at DONG HA and worked in conjunction with the 4th Marines LSA Complex. Thereafter, all classes of supply were obtained from the DONG HA complex.

b. Personnel and Administration

(1) The S-1/Adjutant established a Battalion Administrative Center aboard the LPH on D-1. The Administrative Center consisted of the Asst S-1/Adjutant, two S-1 clerks, each Company Administrative Chief and a UD/SRB clerk from each company (except Btry A, 1-13, Ad Chief only). These administrative personnel remained on the rolls of their respective companies/batteries. The Administrative Center functioned and operated as if the Battalion was on "Battalion Administration" as the Asst S-1/Adjutant (OinC, Admin Center) has "By direction" authority to sign UDs, SRBs and routine matters pertaining to all companies. Appropriate personnel records were moved to the LPH with the Admin Personnel. The Admin Center was dissolved after withdrawal.

(2) The S-1/Adjutant and the remainder of the administrative personnel

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deployed with the Battalion Command Post and operated in the field in accordance with the USMC Staff Manual.

(3) References, Manuals, Orders, etc.

(a) Central files and orders and directives were maintained in the Admin Center.

(b) Field elements operated with an absolute minimum. Laminated waterproof charts were utilized to keep an accurate up-to-date personnel daily summary of all participating units/detachments. A copy of the Operation Order and pertinent personnel and casualty reporting directives were the only references taken forward or needed. The S-1/Adjutant section "desk" consisted of a hand made waterproof box size approximately 18" x 24" x 12" in which was carried the necessary admin supplies and directives, i.e. memo pads, personnel rosters, notebooks, message books, casualty reporting cards, pens and pencils. A portable typewriter was not carried nor absolutely needed.

c. Casualty Reporting

(1) Casualty reporting was in accordance with CMC, FMFFAC, 9thMAB and BLT directives in 3040 series. The casualty reporting center was established aboard the LPH and consisted of SLE/BLT Admin and Medical personnel. As the BLT SRBs were maintained in the Admin Center this enabled the casualty reporting center to obtain individual service records immediately as needed.

(2) 782 gear and personnel effects of casualties were inventoried and safeguarded by Logistic and Administrative personnel on the LPH respectively.

d. Evacuation. Evacuation of casualties was accomplished by helicopters. Med-Evac requests were handled and coordinated by the S-4 in the field and the TacLog aboard the LPH while OpCon to SLE. When the BLT chopped to the 4th Marines, Med-Evac requests were coordinated by the Battalion Air Liaison Officer with the 4th Marines Air Officer.

e. Captives. After completion of initial interrogation all captives were delivered to Headquarters, 4th Marines.

f. Civic Action. Civic action was coordinated by the SLE Commander and his Staff. BLT Medical and Dental personnel donated their services to the nearby local village of GIA LINH.

g. Miscellaneous

(1) There were no disciplinary problems or incidents.

(2) There were no replacements from sources outside the BLT.

(3) The BLT Chaplains visited and held religious services in the field.

(4) Mail was delivered in the field.

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 1.E. 27 & 79.5 1/A DECKHOUSE IV etc.)

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(5) Guard mail was delivered and picked up by helicopter.

7. Supporting Arms (General)

a. FSCC

(1) BLT 1-26 was supported by a 105mm Howitzer Battery, a 107mm Mortar Battery, the USS ST PAUL and USS HULL, and by close air support from 1st Marine Air Wing. It is believed that all phases of supporting arms were excellent.

(2) If it is necessary for the BLT to chop to regimental control at some later date then all wheeled radio gear would probably have to be available. Even though communications was not a great problem, this was due mainly to the improved characteristics of RRC-25 and to our nearness to Regimental CP.

(3) Helicopter operations within the AOA was still the greatest problem with fire support coordination. The Save A Plane system was a start in the right direction but it did not have a fast enough reaction time. The simplest thing to do on the Battalion level is to have all low flying aircraft check in with the Battalion ALO. He could then relay any late fire missions that had come up since he was briefed.

b. Artillery

(1) The only problem, except for helicopters, occurred after the BLT had chopped to 4th Regiment. It was necessary to fire barrage data. It took the Battery three days to be built up to its basic allowance of ammunition. For the first two days it was necessary to restrict firing of night defensive fires due to low state of ammo.

c. Naval Gunfire Support

(1) Naval gunfire support played an important role in the operation, accounting for a significant number of enemy dead and wounded. The indirect fire support, however, seemed to be much better and more accurate from ships who have had previous time on the line. It is imperative that ships be well trained in gunnery operations and exercises before reporting for duty as a direct support ship where they may be called on to provide close support for troops ashore. Because of the inexperience of the USS HULL (DD-945), she was not called on often for direct support. She had mechanical difficulties which seemed to stem directly from lack of activity of her battery. She did become better as the operation progressed. The USS ST PAUL (CA-73) provided excellent support, her 8" guns being called in as close as 200 yards to friendly lines during one enemy assault. The enthusiasm and spirit, coupled with good shooting, of the Naval ships, was a significant factor in the success of the operation and once again upheld the highest traditions of the Navy-Marine Corps Team.

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(1) Communications was considered good, especially with the MRC-62 in operation. Communications between the ALO and FAC's was sporadic at times due mainly to the shortage of BB-451 batteries.

(2) Close air support was outstanding and quite effective. However, 99% of the air was controlled by the TAC(A), debilitating the true value of a FAC with a rifle company. It is believed the FAC could be more effective if he were put in a UH-1E to control from the air since obviously this is the method being employed. In this way not only would the battalion always have a TAC(A) (the battalion's own FACs) available, but the TAC(A) would know and understand the battalion's scheme of maneuver. From two operations it is concluded that this is the better method of employing the battalion's FACs than the present method of being attached to the rifle companies. The battalion would also have coverage for all the rifle companies instead of just two. It must be borne in mind that normally the BLT will have a TAC(A) supporting the battalion and therefore the FACs should be employed in this manner.

8. Commander's Analysis

a. Operation DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE proved to be a highly successful operation for imparting sound combat experience to all officers and men of BLT 1-26 although it was an essentially different type of operation than that encountered during DECKHOUSE III PHASE I and PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO. The BLT was opposed by NVA regular troops that fought using conventional tactics. There was little attempt on the part of the enemy to evade our forces. They had prepared positions and waited for the BLT forces to come within range. Fire support was outstanding once all units were ashore and prepared to fire.

b. The transition from COMSEVENTHFLT operational control to operational control of III MAF was accomplished smoothly and expeditiously. Operational control was exercised directly by 4th Marines. Radio nets were established with 4th Marines and a Force Recon element occupying an OP in the BLT Area of Operations.

c. Although civic action was not extensive the units of the BLT in close proximity to villages offered their assistance and in several cases medical attention was given. When the BLT withdrew from the area excess rations were given to the local villagers.

d. During DECKHOUSE III PHASE I and PHASE II/Operation TOLEDO HMM-363 furnished 2 direct support helicopters and 2 Med Evac helicopters which were under the direct control of the BLT Commander. During DECKHOUSE IV/Operation PRAIRIE HMM-363 chopper to III MAF for OpCon. As a result the above procedure was not followed resulting in delay of logistics support. It is highly recommended that wherever possible direct support helicopters be assigned to the BLT in order to perform their mission.

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3121
26 September 1966

REPORT OF DECKHOUSE IV/PRAIRIE

1. Task OrganizationBLT 1-26

LtCol MONTI

H&S Co (-)
Det, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Co (-), 26th Mar

Radio Relay Tm
Det, Postal Unit
Det, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div (Photo)
Det, Disbursing

Det, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn
Logistic Support Group

Det, Command Sect
Det, MT Sect
Det, Supply Sect
Det, Maint Sect

1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th MT Bn
Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med Bn

Det, Collecting Plt
Clearing Sect
Det, 15th Dental Co, FMF

Co A (Rein)

Capt VELASQUEZ

Co A
Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plt
1st FC Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
1st FAC Tm

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1st FC Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)
1st Sqd (-), 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn

Co B (Rein)

Capt SIMPSON

Co B

ENCLOSURE (1)

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Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plt
2nd FC Tm, 81mm Mortar Flt2nd FC Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn
2nd Sqd, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr BnCo D (Rein)

Capt WEIDNER

Co D
Det, H&S Co, 1-26Det, Med Plt
4th FC Tm, 81mm Mortar Flt
2nd FAC Tm4th FC Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
3rd Sqd, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar

Capt BAILY

Btry A (-)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2nd Bn, 12th Mar

Capt MERRITT

107mm Mortar Btry
Det, Mess Sec, Serv Flt, Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn1st Flt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AmTrac Bn

1stLt DIBELLO

1st Flt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn

1stLt DEBILIO

1st Flt
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-)(Rein)1st Flt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn

2ndLt DEAR

1st Flt (-)
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)81mm Mortar Flt (-) (Rein)

1stLt MOONEY

106mm Recoiless Rifle Flt (Rein)

1stLt TERRILL

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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106RR Plt
Flame Sec
Det, Med Flt, H&S Co, 1-26

1st Flt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Tk Bn

1stLt LARKIN

1st Flt, 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF

Capt JORDAN

1st Flt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn

1stLt SPAINHOUR

1st Flt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SF Bn

Capt ANDERSON

1st Flt
Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

BLT Reserve

Co C (Rein)

Co C
Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med 1lt
3rd FC Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

3rd FC Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
1st Sqd (-), 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn

2. Intelligence

a. Terrains: The objective area includes part of the Central Vietnam lowlands. The Central Vietnam lowlands, a zone of low, poorly drained terrain, originating in the foot hills of the Annam Mountains, terminates at the coastline in a wide belt of massive dunes and low sandy shores continuous except where interrupted by the mouths of rivers and lagoons. A narrow transitional zone of rounded hills parallels the coastline 15 to 20 miles inland and separates the lowlands from the Annam Mountains. Trafficability is fair to poor throughout the area. During heavy rains cross-country movement is extremely difficult on the Coastal Plain. The land is devoted to wetland rice paddies throughout the plain and beginning about 8 miles inland are scattered stands of woodland and brush. Highway 1 runs north-south about 10 miles inland. Highway 9 commences at Dong Ha (YD 239608) and runs west. The Song Hieu Giang and Song Thach Ham Rivers, which originate in the Annam Mountains, are the major tributaries which meet and form the Cau Viet River at YD 267625. The Cau Viet River from this point runs to the sea. LCM's may navigate the Cau Viet to where it joins the Thach Hau, however from there to Quang Tri, only LCP's may navigate. A stream parallels the beach approximately 4.2 miles inland. Highways 1 and 9 cross numerous bridges of various structures through-

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out the area. The dune belt which extends inland 2.4 miles consists mostly of sandy ridges up to 20 feet in height with patches of dryland crops. Avenues of approach are unrestricted on the coastal plain.

b. Beach Study. Blue Beach (YD 299749) is a straight beach extending in a northwest-southeast direction, and is 1.5 miles long. The beach averages one hundred feet in width. Composition is soft sand, firm where wet. Beach gradient of the foreshore is 1:12. Nearshore approach to the beach is partially restricted by submerged sand bars located 225 yards offshore and paralleling beach. Clearance over sand bar centers is 6 to 10 feet at low tide. Nearshore gradient is 1:30.

c. Enemy Situation.

(1) General. The exact current location and disposition of the NVA forces in and around the DMZ cannot be determined at this time. However, there are indications of elements of these forces currently operating as far south as route 9. Since the withdrawal of the 324B Div at the end of Operation HASTINGS, reconnaissance and air crews have reported extensive supply activity in the DMZ area, including dispersed supply points, road traffic and movement of material by sea. There has been over 130 secondary explosions reported resulting from air strikes in or north of the DMZ.

d. Order of Battle. There have been no recent significant activities in the AOA, although this area is suspected to be a highly used infiltration area and probably many caches may be uncovered. Most recent and accepted OOB for the QUANG TRI area includes but is not limited to the following:

324B Div	DMZ Vic YD 030720
90th Regt	Vic YD 050650
803rd Regt	Vic YD 990600
808th Regt	Vic YD 370570

The 341st NVA Div is dispersed into rural and forested areas in or north of the DMZ. This unit is the southernmost NVA Div in North Vietnam. The most recent area of operation for the 341st Div is an area in the vicinity of Vinh Linh north of the DMZ.

3. Mission. As defined in CTC 79.5 Frag Order #1 (111544Z Sept66) to reference (a).

"Conduct waterborne amphibious assault over Beach BLUE and helicopterborne assault into selected landing zones to conduct search and destroy operations and screen northern approaches to AOA in support of Operation PRAIRIE."

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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- a. See Tab A to enclosure (1) for Landing Force and BLT Objectives.

4. Concept of Operations

a. At L-hour Company A was to land over beach BLUE by LVT to attack and seize Landing Force Objective 1. Battery A was to land in trace and establish an initial firing position in the vicinity of Beach BLUE. At H-hour Company B was to be helilifted to LZ SPARROW and to attack in assigned zone to seize LF Objective 2. Company C was to be helilifted to LZ WREN and attack in assigned zone to seize LF Objectives 4 and 3. BLT 1-26 CF, Company C and the 107mm Mortar battery were to land in LZ SPARROW. Upon seizure of LF Objectives the units were to conduct search and destroy operations in the ACA.

5. Execution

- a. D-day - 15 September 1966

(1) Company A landed by LVTH-5 over Beach BLUE at 0730H (H-hour), followed by Wave 2 which was composed of Shore Party Platoon (-), Beachmaster Unit (-), and a Recon Party Battery A, 13th Marines. No enemy contact was made during the landing. Company A attacked to the southeast and secured Objective 1 at 0910H. Battery A was landed over Beach BLUE at 0800H and established initial firing positions at YD 300744.

(2) Company B was helilifted to Landing Zone SPARROW at 0730H (L-hour). At 0850H Company B was helilifted to Landing Zone WREN. No contact was made in either Landing Zone. At 1015H the Command Group landed in Landing Zone SPARROW followed by 107mm Mortar Battery at 1020H. At 1110H a simultaneous helilift of H&S Company from the USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) and Company C from the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2) commenced. At 1230H the amphibious assault was complete.

(3) At 0850H Company B commenced attack to seize Objective 4. Company D commenced attack to seize Objective 2 at 1320H. At 1300H the Division Recon Platoon, under OpCon SLP made contact with an estimated NVA Company and requested assistance from the BLT. Close air support and artillery were provided. The engagement resulted in 9 NVA KIA confirmed and 30 NVA KIA probable. At 1320H Company A made contact with 3 VC at YD 300737. The VC broke contact and fled to the south. Two cement bunkers were discovered at YD 300737. At 1530H Shore Party Platoon received 10 VC suspects from a Coast Guard vessel. At 1330H Battery A commenced helilifting to Landing Zone EAGLE to establish a new firing position. At 1554H Company D secured Objective 2. At 1300H the Anti-Tank Platoon was moved up the river by boat to DUNG HA, moved from DUNG HA across country, and arrived at Landing Zone EAGLE. At 1730H Company B secured Objective 4.

(4) At 1750H Beach BLUE was closed, and Shore Party Platoon and Beachmaster Unit returned to the USS THOMASTON (LSL-28). The amphibian Tractor Platoon returned to the USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2).

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(5) As of 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 197694
Company A	YD 213662
Company B	YD 167715
Company C	YD 197694
Company D	YD 185735
Battery A	YD 213662
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 191697
AT Platoon	YD 213662

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(6) No contact was made during the night.

b. D+1 - 16 September 1966

(1) At 0500H Company D received 4 rounds of mortar and 21 rounds of small arms fire from the southeast. Fire was returned and contact was broken.

(2) Companies A, B and D began moving shortly after first light. At 1015H Company D secured Objective 3. Control of naval gunfire and artillery was passed ashore at 1100H. At 1119H Company B received scattered small arms fire from 3 snipers in village located at YD 160714. During the search of the village 5 VCS were captured in addition to propaganda material.

(3) At 1530H 2 booby traps exploded in the Company D position at YD 170730 inflicting 3 WIA. Nine booby traps were destroyed in place. At 1600H coordination of air passed ashore. At 1650H Company B received scattered small arms fire from YD 153716. At 1711H Company B came under heavy small arms fire from the front and both flanks at YD 153716. Company B was in contact with an estimated NVA company and sustained 2 KIA and 9 WIA. Artillery and close air supported Company B. The contact was broken at 1740H and resulted in 7 NVA KIA (body count), 4 KIA (possible) and 12 WIA (possible). Company B secured Objective 5 at 1745H. At 1720H mortar rounds were received by Company D from YD 165738. Naval gunfire destroyed 3 mortars and 14 NVA KIA (all confirmed). At 1755H Company A uncovered foxholes for about 80 personnel at YD 173653. Packs and clothing were scattered about the area.

(4) At 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 197694
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ENCLOSURE (1)

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Company A	YD 171649
Company B	YD 151719
Company C	YD 197694
Company D	YD 168732
Battery A	YD 213662
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 197694
AT Platoon	YD 213662

(5) At 2210H an estimated 15 VC probed Battery A inflicting 1 WIA. At 2303H Company D received 2 rounds of mortar fire. 107mm Mortar Battery fired counterbattery with good effect. At 2305H the BLT 1-26 CI received 2 grenades and automatic weapons fire from south of the CR. At 2340H the BLT 1-26 CI received 1 60mm Mortar round from south of the CR. Company C used 60mm mortar counterbattery with good effect.

c. D-2 - 17 September 1966

(1) At 0018H Battery A, 13th Marines had four grenades thrown into their perimeter, inflicting one WIA.

(2) At 0341H, Company A was attacked by an estimated company-size NVA unit with heavy small arms and Mortar fire from both flanks of the perimeter. The contact was broken at 0353H (Company A sustained 1 KIA and 12 WIA). Artillery and naval gunfire supported Company A. At first light the company moved out to continue its mission and investigate the results of the previous action. At 0615H the company discovered 11 NVA KIA's (Est 20 KIA, 30 WIA) and captured the following items at YD 173652:

- 4 Automatic weapons
- 20 Magazines
- 300 Rounds of assorted small arms ammunition
- 6 AT mines
- 98 grenades
- 4 AT Rocket Launchers with 12 rounds
- Miscellaneous packboards, web equipment and clothing

(3) At 0740H the Force Recon Platoon was inserted at YD 282748 to conduct surveillance of the beach area. As Company A continued sweeping through the area in the vicinity of YD 173652 1 VCC wearing a khaki uniform and rubber boots was captured. At 0845H 4 carbines, 2 rocket rounds and numerous fresh blood stains were discovered. Indications were that the NVA's were hastily retreating to the north. At 0925H Company A found the body of the Recon Platoon MIA under a bush. His wounds had been bandaged by the NVA's but he had died from loss of blood. At 1000H a platoon from Company C was helilifted to establish a blocking position at YD 168675 in

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support of Company A. At 1310H Company A discovered 30 to 40 freshly dug emplacements, 1 booby trap kit, 100 rounds of small arms ammunition, 1 home-made gas mask, and miscellaneous engineer tools at YD 151669.

(4) At 1345H Company D entered a village located at YD 156737. The search of the village uncovered miscellaneous propaganda items, punji stakes, and a few trenches. There were no males present in the village. At 1515H Company D was hit by heavy small arms and automatic weapons from both sides of the road at YD 146730. After calling artillery fires Company D advanced and again came under heavy fire at 1535H. Artillery was again utilized. At 1545H Company D again began receiving fire.

(5) At 1545H a patrol from Company B received fire at YD 146711. The patrol returned fire and the VC fled. The patrol found several bags of rice and large amounts of fresh blood in the area. The action resulted in 5 VC WIA confirmed. The Company C Platoon blocking force returned at 1554H.

(5) At 1633H a Med Evac helicopter was shot down by small arms fire. Emergency repairs were made and the helicopter was able to fly out although Company D was still under fire. Air strikes were run and at 1800H Company D had broken contact.

(7) At 2000H units were in the following positions:

BLT 1-26	YD 197694
Company A	YD 163667
Company B	YD 151719
Company C	YD 197694
Company D	YD 152734
Battery A	YD 213662
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 191697
AT Platoon	YD 213662

(8) At 2005H two groups of white lights and one red light were observed. One group was located 700 meters east of the BLT CP and the second group was 1500 meters to the west. The lights were evaluated as VC night sighting devices for mortars. 81mm Mortars were fired on both targets. The lights were either destroyed or extinguished. At 2020H a Company A ambush reported 6 VC moving at YD 166671. 60mm Mortars were employed. An estimated 1 VC KIA, 1 VC WIA probable were the results. There was no further activity during D+2.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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d. D+3 - 18 September 1966

(1) Company D received mortar fire at 0040H. Artillery fired counter battery and the mortars were silenced. Company A was probed at 0315H with one hand grenade. Company B received 3 rounds of 57mm recoilless rifle and 20 rounds of 82mm mortar at 0630H. Air was called with good effect and the fire ceased.

(2) At 0700H Company A began advancing to Objective 6 and Company D attacked to seize Objective 7. At 0845H the LVT Platoon, less vehicles, was helilifted to LZ EAGLE. The Tank Platoon personnel were returned to the USS THOMASTON (LSD-28). The Tank Platoon, with vehicles, was embarked aboard LCM-8's for movement to DONG HA.

(3) At 0945H Company D made heavy contact. They received automatic weapons fire from both sides and the front at YD 146730. The lead platoon suffered one KIA and one WIA when they passed through a boobytrapped gate. One large bunker was located on the road in the center of the village. Extremely heavy fire forced Company D to withdraw. Naval gunfire and artillery were called in to cover the withdrawal. Contact was broken.

(4) At 1000H Company A secured Objective 6. The BLT chopped OpCon to the Third MAF at 1200H. This terminated Operation DECKHOUSE IV and initiated Operation BRAILLE for the BLT. The BLT was assigned the mission of conducting search and destroy operations in assigned TAOR. (See Tab B) At 1455H Company D again came under heavy fire from the village located at YD 146730. Supporting arms were employed and at 1534H the company began withdrawing to the Company B position located at Objective 5. The Company D engagement during the day resulted in 35 NVA KIA (confirmed), 45 KIA (probable). Total equipment captured or destroyed included 4 AK-47 rifles, 7 SKS Carbines, 50 stick grenades, 500 rounds of ammunition, and 11 magazines. At 1616H Battery A displaced to a new firing position at YD 167682. At 1800H the Tank and Shore Party Platoons were established at DONG HA. At 1820H Company D reached Objective 5 and linked up with Company B.

(5) At 2000H units were located as follows.

BLT 1-26	YD 197694
Company A	YD 153669
Company B	YD 152719
Company C	YD 197694
Company D	YD 152716
Battery A	YD 168682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 191697

Tank Platoon DONG HA

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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(6) There was no further contact during 18-3.

e. D+4 - 19 September 1966

(1) No contact was made during the night. Company A began advancing to YD 142687. At 0845H a platoon from Company C was helilifted to DONG HA to join with the Tank Platoon. As Company D advanced toward the village (YD 147717) at 0907H they came under small arms and automatic weapons fire. At 0912H Company D was heavily engaged. Four NVA were surprised and killed in a hut. The NVA's wore green uniforms, helmets, and belt buckles with red stars. Three burp guns were captured.

(2) At 0907H the Tank Platoon reinforced with 2 flame tanks from Company C, 3rd Tank Battalion and a platoon from Company C left DONG HA en route to YD 142689. Company D pulled back from the village located at YD 147717 under heavy fire. Supporting arms saturated the area. At 1027H Company D attacked again and once again ran into heavy fire. An air strike at YD 147716 produced secondary explosions. At 1101H Company D again entered the village and found many trenches and tunnels. The company began destroying the tunnels with demolitions. At 1300H Company D received small arms fire. At 1327H the company came under heavy automatic weapons fire, and again pulled back to Objective 5. Air and naval gunfire were employed. At least 35 NVA's covered with napalm were seen running from the trenches.

(3) At 1414H the BLT CP, Company C and the 107mm Mortar Battery displaced by helicopter to YD 142689. Company D again moved toward the village conducting reconnaissance by fire at 1420H. Company D continued to advance against light opposition until 1658H. When they came under heavy automatic weapons fire from both flanks. The company was pinned down. Supporting arms were employed but each time artillery fire lifted, the NVA's resumed fire. At 1708H Company D received automatic weapons fire at YD 152716. Fire was returned and artillery fire was called. The contact was broken at 1710H.

(4) As a Company A ambush party departed the BLT CP at 1910H, they made contact with three VC. The VC threw a grenade and fled. At 1915H, while moving toward hill 109 (YD 125711) the Tank Platoon (Rein) and a platoon from Company C received automatic weapons fire and one 57mm recoilless rifle round at YD 136707. Fire was returned, including 20 rounds of 90mm cannister. The NVA withdrew under the cover of darkness after receiving 15 KIA (probable) and 6 WIA (probable). At 1920H Company D broke contact. There were 53 NVA KIA (confirmed), 43 NVA KIA (probable), 2 carbines, 1 light machinegun, and 1 submachinegun destroyed during the day.

(5) At 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 142689
Company A	YD 142689

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Company B	YD 152719
Company C	YD 125710
Company D	YD 152719
Battery A	YD 168682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 140688
Tank Platoon	YD 136789
3rd Platoon Co C	YD 136789
AT Platoon	YD 168682

(6) At 2135H Battery A observed 15 VC moving but no contact was made. There was no further contact during the night of D+4.

f. D+5 - 20 September 1966

(1) At 0214H Company D received sniper fire from YD 152726. The company returned fire and called 81mm mortar fire. Contact was broken. At 1100H Company C and Tank Platoon attacked toward Objective A. At 1540H a tank hit an AT mine at YD 135720 and 3 NVA were seen at YD 135721. Four more AT mines and 2 field expedient AP mines were found in the vicinity. At 1845H Company B received 5 mortar rounds in the vicinity of YD 152717. Artillery provided counterbattery fire and the mortars were silenced.

(2) At 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 142689
Company A	YD 142689
Company B	YD 152719
Company C	YD 135712
Company D	YD 149712
Battery B	YD 168682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 140688
Tank Platoon	YD 135712
Anti-Tank Platoon	YD 135712

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(3) There was no contact during the night of D+5.

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g. D+6 - 21 September 1966

(1) Company C received 25 rounds of mortar fire at 0515H. At 0745H Company C attacked to seize Objective A. At 0815H one AT rocket hit a tank and small arms fire was received at the front of Company C. Fire was returned and resulted in two NVA KIA's (confirmed), 2 rocket launchers captured, 5 grenades, and 30 rounds of Russian 7.62mm ammunition. At 0850H more NVA's opened fire from the company's right flank at YD 137717. Flame tanks were employed and 30 NVA were killed by body count. At 0920H two tanks were hit by AT rockets fired by a four man rocket team. The damage was minor and one tank fired cannister at 75 yards. The four NVA's were disintegrated. Resistance stiffened as the company began receiving heavy fire from trenches to the front. Company C pulled back 50 yards, called air strikes and resumed the attack. At 1020H heavy contact was made at YD 139717 when AT rockets and automatic weapons fire was received from trenches. At 1130H Company C broke contact.

(2) Company D maneuvered to the right of Company C, and Company B joined the right flank of Company D while supporting arms fired on Objective A. At 1533H Companies B, C and D, supported by tanks attacked to seize Objective A. At 1645H Objective A was secured when the NVA force broke contact and fled north. There were 16 NVA KIA's (confirmed) and 89 NVA KIA's (probable).

(3) At 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 142689
Company A	YD 142689
Company B	YD 142724
Company C	YD 138710
Company D	YD 149718
Battery A	YD 168682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 140688
Tank Platoon	YD 138720
Anti-Tank Platoon	YD 168682

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(4) There was no contact during the night of D+6.

h. D+7 - 22 September 1966

(1) At 0307H Companies C and D received approximately 45 rounds of mortar fire. Naval gunfire silenced the mortars. At 0550H Companies C and D again received mortar fire. Company B observed 8 VC moving toward

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the company perimeter at 0630H. At 0645H the VC were fired on by small arms, M-79's, and naval gunfire. There were 2 KIA's (confirmed) and 3 KIA's (probable).

(2) At 0930H Company C discovered an unoccupied trench and bunker complex running from YD 127124 to YD 120719. At 0945H two LVT's arrived at DUNG HA after moving up river from the USS VANCOUVER (LHD-2). A column of four tanks from Company C, 3rd Tank Battalion, the two LVT's and a platoon from Company A departed DUNG HA at 1230H to link up with Company C. At 1030H Company D received scattered small arms fire from YD 145740. At 1146H Company D received scattered small arms fire from the front. At 1242H Company C made contact with a rocket team at YD 124720 and killed one NVA (confirmed). A rocket launcher, 3 rockets, 2 automatic weapons, 3 grenades, 1 light machinegun barrel and 1 can of Russian 7.62mm linked ammunition were captured. At 1400H Company C made further contact at YD 124720 and killed 2 NVA (confirmed). At 1402H a tank in the column from DUNG HA hit a mine at YD 136676. At 1530H Company D uncovered 17 bodies, an extensive trench network, bunkers reinforced with concrete and many spider holes at YD 140730. At 1635H Company C came under machinegun fire at YD 117719. The company attacked and killed 5 NVA (confirmed) and 2 (probable). At 1400H a patrol from Battery A visited a nearby Catholic Orphanage and donated 30 cans of C-Rations. At 1657H Company D sighted 12 VC at YD 135733 and called in artillery fire.

(3) at 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 142689
Company A	YD 142689
Company B	YD 133772
Company C	YD 118719
Company D	YD 118719
Battery A	YD 168682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 140688
Tank Platoon	YD 118719
AT Platoon	YD 168682
Platoon (-) Company C,	YD 173671
3rd Tank Battalion	

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(4) At 2317H Company B observed what appeared to be mortar aiming lights outside their perimeter. Artillery fire was called and the lights were extinguished. There was no further contact during D+7.

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i. D+8 - 23 September 1966

(1) As Company B continued search and destroy operations they made contact at 0830H at YD 135735. An aid station was found and evidence that a NVA platoon was in the area. The Company gave chase and at YD 121733 they discovered a tunnel complex. One tunnel was 12 feet by 45 feet and contained five cases of medical supplies. Local women stated that two NVA platoons had just passed through the area and were accompanied by Chinese Advisors. Company B pursued but could not make contact. At 0935H Company C came under AT rocket and automatic weapons fire from YD 115719. One tank detonated an AT mine. When the company attacked the NVA's fled. At 0945H 30 NVA were observed at YD 111727 and naval gunfire was called. Twenty NVA were killed. At 1730H as Company B entered a village located at YD 120725 they received a heavy volume of mortar and automatic weapon fire. The NVA broke contact and fled at 1750H. One NVA was captured and evacuated to the 4th Marines Cr. At 1950H the Company B perimeter was probed. The NVA broke contact and fled. One VCS was captured.

(2) At 2000H units were located as follows:

BLT 1-26	YD 142689
Company A	YD 142689
Company B	YD 120724
Company C	YD 109697
Company D	YD 115708
Battery A	YD 118682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 140688
Tank Platoon (Rein)	YD 109697
AT Platoon	YD 168682

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(3) There was no further contact during the night of D+8.

j. D+9 - 24 September 1966

(1) The amphibious withdrawal commenced at 0700H. Companies B and D were helilifted to the USS IWO JIMI (LPH-2) along with designated supplies. At 1200H the BLT chopped OpCon from 4th Marines to TG 79.5 (SLF). As the Tank Platoon (Rein) with elements of Company C were enroute to DONG HA at 1500H the column was hit from the rear by AT rockets and automatic weapons at YD 135633. The tanks and infantry deployed and returned fire and an airstrike was delivered. The action resulted in 7 KIA (confirmed) and 20 KIA (probable). The column proceeded on to DONG HA.

(2) At 2000H units were located as follows:

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BLT 1-26	YD 142689
Company A	YD 142689
Company B	LFH-2
Company C	DONG HA
Company D	LFH-2
Battery A	YD 168682
107mm Mortar Battery	YD 140688
Tank Platoon (Rein)	DONG HA
AT Platoon	YD 168682

(3) There was no contact during the night of D+9.

k. D+10 - 25 September 1966

(1) At first light the withdrawal continued. Company C and the Tank Platoon (Rein), Battery A and the AT Platoon returned to their respective ships by landing craft from DONG HA. Company A, the 107mm Mortar Battery and H&S Company were helilifted to the amphibious shipping from LZ BLUEBIRD.

The operation terminated at 251500H September 1966.

6. Results

a. Enemy

(1) The following is the assessment of NVA and VC personnel casualties inflicted by Battalion Landing Team 1-26:

(a) KIA (BODY COUNT)	254
(b) KIA (PROBABLE)	313
(c) WIA (CONFIRMED)	14
(d) NVA Captives	1
(e) VCS	13
(f) VCC	3

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(2) The following is a compilation of enemy equipment and material captured or destroyed by Battalion Landing Team 1-26:

15

ENCLOSURE (1)

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(a) 7.62 Sub machinegun AK-47 Chicom Type 56 24

(b) 7.62 Carbine SKS Chicom Type 56 15

(c) 7.62 LMG RPD Chicom Type 56 2

(d) AT Rkt Launchers RPG-2 9

(e) Stick Type Grenades 153

(f) Magazines assorted 31

(g) S/A Ammo Assorted 4900 Rds

(h) 40mm AT Ammo 22 Rds

(i) Home made Gas Mask 2

(j) Medical Supplies assorted 10 Lbs

(k) Documents 15 Lbs

(l) U.S. Frag Grenades 13

(m) Tonicillin 2 Cases

(n) Packboards and Ponches 30

(o) Bunkers 70

(p) Trenchlines and tunnels 1200 Meters

b. Friendly

(1) Casualties sustained by Battalion Landing Team 1-26 are summarized below:

(a) KIA -34

1 Gunshot - 28

2 Shrapnel - 6

(b) Died of Wounds - 2

1 Gunshot - 2

(c) WIA - 167

1 Gunshot - 66

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- 2 Shrapnel - 101
- (d) Non-Battle Casualties - 75
 - 1 Malaria - 10
 - 2 Heat - 19
 - 3 Sprains - 17
 - 4 Miscellaneous - 29

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
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BLT



26

1/26
OPD 328-67, DECK HOUSE IV

**DECKHOUSE
IV**

OPERATION ORDER

328-67

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

H. J.
298352

(1 Rep 66)

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Encl (3)

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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
131000H September 1966

Change Number 1 to Operation Order 328-67

Time Zone: H

1. In Annex K, delete present grid coordinates for Check Point GRAIN and add grid coordinates 200670.



A. K. MONTI

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-67

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3

BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Operation Order 328-67 (DECKHOUSE IV)

Ref: (a) CTG 79.5 FRAG ORDER #1 for DECKHOUSE IV
 (b) CTG 79.5 OpPlan 328-67
 (c) Maps: AMS L7014 6342 I, (1:50,000) CAM-LO
 AMS L7014 6342 II, (1:50,000) THON DOC KINH
 AMS L7014 6442 I, (1:50,000) THON NGO XA DONG
 AMS L7014 6442 III, (1:50,000) BA LONG
 AMS L7014 6442 IV, (1:50,000) QUANG TRI

Time Zone: H

Task Organization: Annex A (Task Organization)

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

- (1) Annex B (Intelligence)
- (2) Current Intelligence Summaries

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 1st MAW provides air support.
- (2) An ARVN battalion located in vicinity of YD 214734.
- (3) A Regional Force Company located in vicinity of YD 232721.
- (4) Elements of Task Force Delta operating in area to the west of AOA.

c. Attachments and Detachments

- (1) Annex A (Task Organization)
- (2) Recon Group (1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon and 1st Plt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn) are detached from BLT 1-26 effective 0001, D-1 and attached to CTG 79.5 to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions as directed.

2. MISSION. BLT 1-26 commencing at H and L hours lands over designated beach and in helicopter landing zones to seize landing force objectives and conduct search and destroy operations in AOA.

3. EXECUTION

a. Concept of Operations

- (1) Commencing at H-hour land one rifle company over Beach BLUE by LVT to attack and seize LF Obj 1 with the additional mission as a reaction force.

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- (2) Commencing at L-hour land one rifle company by helicopter in LZ SPARROW to attack and seize LF Obj 2.
 - (3) Land one rifle company in LZ WREN to attack and seize LF Objs 3 and 4.
 - (4) Land one rifle company by helicopter in LZ SPARROW as BLT Reserve.
 - (5) Land Tank Plt and AT Plt by landing craft on north side of SONG BO DIEU River in vicinity of YD 273651 or YD 243613.
 - (6) Land 107mm Mortar Btry by helicopter in vicinity of LZ SPARROW and establish firing positions.
 - (7) Land Btry A over Beach BLUE by LVT and establish initial firing positions in vicinity of LF Obj 1.
- b. Company D (Rein)
- (1) Land by helicopter in LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN) on D-day at L-hour in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and secure landing zone.
 - (2) On order attack and seize LF Obj 2.
 - (3) On order conduct search and destroy missions in assigned zone of action as directed.
- c. Company A (Rein)
- (1) Commencing at H-hour, D-day, land over Beach BLUE by LVT.
 - (2) Attack and seize LF Obj 1.
 - (3) Establish a company patrol base and conduct search and destroy missions in Specified Strike Zone as directed.
 - (4) Be prepared to act as a reaction force. One reinforced rifle platoon on 30 minute standby, one reinforced rifle platoon on 60 minute standby and one reinforced rifle platoon on 90 minute standby.
- d. Company B (Rein)
- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in LZ WREN (ALT - LZ SPARROW) in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
 - (2) On order attack and seize LF Objs 3 and 4.
 - (3) On order conduct search and destroy missions as directed in

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assigned zone of action.

e. Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines

- (1) Land by LVT over Beach BLUE and establish initial firing positions in vicinity of LF Obj 1.
- (2) Be prepared to move by LVT or CH-46 helicopter to vicinity of LZ SPARROW.
- (3) Direct support of BLT 1-26.

f. 107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2d Bn, 12th Marines

- (1) Land by helicopter on D-day at LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN) in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Establish firing positions in vicinity of LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN).
- (3) Direct support of BLT 1-26.

g. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th AmTrac Bn

- (1) Land assault elements of BLT 1-26 in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Remain on Beach BLUE and act as prime mover for 105 Howitzers of Btry A to vicinity of LF Obj 1.
- (3) Remain with Btry A as security force.
- (4) General support of BLT 1-26.

h. 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th AT Bn

- (1) Land in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) on northern side of SONG BO DIEU River in vicinity of YD 273651 or YD 243613.
- (2) General support of BLT 1-26.

i. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn

- (1) Land by helicopter in LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN) on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) General support of BLT 1-26.

k. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th Tk Bn

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- (1) Land by landing craft in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) on northern side of SONG BO DIEU River in vicinity of YD 273651 or YD 243613.
 - (2) General support of BLT 1-26.
1. 106 Recoilless Rifle Plt (Rein)
 - (1) Land in LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN) on D-day as a provisional rifle platoon for BLT CP security in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
 - m. 81mm Mortar Plt (-) (Rein)
 - (1) Land by helicopter on D-day in LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN) in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
 - (2) Establish firing positions in vicinity of LZ SPARROW within BLT CP perimeter.
 - (3) General support of BLT 1-26.
 - n. 1st Plt (-) (Rein), Co A, 5th SP Bn
 - (1) Land on D-day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).
 - (2) Establish a beach support area at Beach BLUE in support of operations ashore.
 - (3) On order be prepared to close Beach BLUE and return to assigned shipping.
 - o. BLT Reserve
 - (1) Company C (Rein)
 - (a) Land by helicopter in LZ SPARROW (ALT - LZ WREN) on D-day.
 - (b) Be prepared on order to conduct search and destroy missions as directed.
 - (c) Be prepared to furnish one rifle platoon to move by foot or by helicopter to vicinity of YD 221679 to act as security force for Tank Plt, and AT Plt.
 - (d) Be prepared to assume the mission of any other rifle company.

SECRET-NOFORNp. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) Essential elements of attack: Annex C (Operation Overlay) and Annex D (Landing Plan).
- (2) Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)
- (3) D-day - To be designated
- (4) H-hour - To be designated
- (5) L-hour - To be designated
- (6) W-hour - (Withdrawal) (To be designated)
- (7) AOA for DECKHOUSE IV is land area from YD 282772 west along southern boundary DMZ to north south grid line 16 then south to northern bank SONG CAM LO/CUA VIET River then east to sea. Seaward AOA extends in 25 NM arc from YD 310735. Air space is land and sea AOA from zero to 25,000 feet.
- (8) All units will have front line panel markers.
- (9) Code name for this operation - DECKHOUSE IV.
- (10) Unit commanders emphasize dispersion of troops consistent with terrain.
- (11) All patrols will carry smoke signalling devices.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. See Annex I (Administration and Logistics)

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS - ELECTRONICS

- a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics)

b. Command Posts

- | | <u>AFLOAT</u> | <u>ASHORE</u> |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|------------------|
| (1) CTG 79.5 | LPH-2 | ----- |
| (2) BLT 1-26 | LPH-2 | to be designated |
| (3) HMM-363 | LPH-2 | ----- |
| (4) Subordinate units report locations ashore when established. | | |

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ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT



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ANNEXES

- A - Task Organization
- B - Intelligence
- C - Operation Overlay
- D - Landing Plan
- E - Fire Support Coordination
- F - Communications-Electronics
- G - Reports
- H - Withdrawal Plan (To be issued)
- I - Logistics
- J - Rules of Engagement
- K - Checkpoints
- Z - Distribution

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-67

SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966

Annex A (Task Organization) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: None

Time Zone: H

BLT 1-26

LtCol MONTE

H&S Co (-)
Det, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Ln Tm)
Det, Hq Co (-), 26th MarRadio Relay Tm
Det, Postal Unit
Det, Hq Bn, 5th Mar Div (Photo)
Det, DisbursingDet, Comm Spt Co (-), 9th Comm Bn
Logistic Support GroupDet, Command Sect
Det, MF Sect
Det, Supply Sect
Det, Maint Sect1st Plt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th MF Bn
Det, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Med BnDet, Collecting Plt
Clearing Sect
Det, 15th Dental Co, FMFCo A (Rein)

Capt VELASQUEZ

Co A
Det, H&S Co, 1-26Det, Med Plt
1st FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt
1st FAC Tm1st FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)
1st Sqd (-), 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr BnCo B (Rein)

Capt SIMPSON

Co B

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Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Flt
2nd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Flt2nd FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn
2nd Sqd, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr BnCo D (Rein)Co D
Det, H&S Co, 1-26Det, Med Flt
4th FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Flt
2nd FAC Tm4th FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
3rd Sqd, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar (NGF Spot Tm)Btry A (-) (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th MarBtry A (-)
Det, Hq Btry, 1st Bn, 13th Mar107mm Mortar Btry (-) (Rein), 2nd Bn, 12th Mar107mm Mortar Btry
Det, Mess Sec, Serv Flt, Hq Btry, 2nd Bn, 12th Mar
Det, 1st Flt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn1st Flt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AmTrac Bn1st Flt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th AT Bn1st Flt
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)1st Flt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Engr Bn1st Flt (-)
Det, Co Hq, Co A (-) (Rein)81mm Mortar Flt (-) (Rein)106mm Recoilless Rifle Flt (Rein)106RR Flt
Flame Sec
Det, Med Flt, H&S Co, 1-261st Flt, Co A (-) (Rein), 5th Tk Bn

Capt WEIDNER

Capt BAILEY

Capt MERRITT

1stLt DIBELLO

1stLt DEBILIO

2ndLt DEAR

1stLt MOONEY

1stLt TERRILL

1stLt LARKIN

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1st Plt, 3rd Force Recon Co, FMF

Capt JORDAN

1st Plt, Co A, 5th Recon Bn

1stLt SPAINHOUR

1st Plt (Rein), Co A (-) (Rein), 5th SF Bn

Capt ANDERSON

1st plt
Det, Beachmaster Unit-1

BLT Reserve

Capt KAPPELMAN

Co C (Rein)

Co C
Det, H&S Co, 1-26

Det, Med Plt
3rd FO Tm, 81mm Mortar Plt

3rd FO Tm, Btry A (Rein), 1st Bn, 13th Mar
1st Sqd (-), 1st plt (Rein), Co A, 5th Engr Bn
Det, 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 5th SF Bn



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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H Sept 1966

ANNEX B (Intelligence) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L7014 6342 I, (1:50,000) CAM-LO
 AMS L7014 6342 II, (1:50,000) THON DOC KINH
 AMS L7014 6442 I, (1:50,000) THON NGO XA DONG
 AMS L7014 6442 III, (1:50,000) BA LONG
 AMS L7014 6442 IV, (1:50,000) QUANG TRI
 (b) BnO P3800.1 (Intelligence SOP)

Time Zone: H

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.

- a. See Appendix 1 (Intelligence Estimate)
- b. See current INTSUMS and Special Intelligence Reports as issued.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION.

- a. Determine the location, strength, identification and composition of the North Vietnamese in the area.
- b. Determine if the enemy will reinforce. If so, when, where and in what strength?
- c. Determine the location and condition of LZ's along any route of advance and if they have been booby trapped or mined?

3. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION MISSIONS.a. Orders to subordinate units(1) All units

- (a) Conduct aggressive reconnaissance patrols and make maximum use of observation and listening posts.
- (b) Report all incidents of enemy use of crew served weapons with particular attention to heavy mortars (120mm) and recoilless rifles; include the type of weapons and locations.
- (c) Report all enemy contacts; including disposition, strength, and identification.
- (d) Report all enemy obstacles and tunnels, including those destroyed by friendly troops.

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- (e) Requests for AO support will be forwarded to Battalion S-2
- b. Requests to higher, adjacent and supporting units.
 - (1) Commander, Special Landing Force
 - (a) Provide aerial photography as requested.
 - (b) Provide current and predicted weather data.
 - (c) Provide information as obtained on beach and surf conditions.
 - (d) Provide Tactical Air Observer support as requested.

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING CAPTURED PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

- a. Captured Enemy Personnel. Prisoners of war are lucrative sources of military information. Every effort must be made to capture prisoners. The term "Enemy Personnel" shall include military personnel of any enemy state, civilians bearing arms against our forces or serving their interests.
- b. Processing of Captured Personnel.
 - (1) Capturing units will handle prisoners in accordance with Ref: (b) **emphasizing** the five S's - Search, Segregate, Silence, Speed, and Safeguard. Prisoners will not be mistreated but will be handled so as to maintain the shock of being captured.
 - (2) Capturing units will:
 - (a) Immediately disarm and search Prisoners and enforce rigid silence.
 - (b) Prisoners should be segregated as soon as possible into four groups; Officer, NCO's, Enlisted men, and deserters.
 - (c) Tag segregated Prisoners with standard Prisoner tag as provided.
 - (d) Place documents removed from prisoners in appropriate Captured Document Envelopes as provided and identify with the prisoner.
 - (3) Wounded captives will be given adequate medical treatment

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and will be evacuated through captive medical channels in accordance with the physical condition of the captive. Medical Officer will report to the BLT S-2 any information voluntarily disclosed by wounded captives.

- c. Interrogation. Companies and subordinate units will limit interrogation of Prisoners to developing that information which is of immediate tactical value to the capturing unit. Prisoners must be processed back to trained interrogators as quickly as possible.
 - d. Special Restrictions on Interrogation. The below listed categories of Prisoners are of special importance and interest and should be handled as such:
 - (1) Field Grade Officers
 - (2) Pilots and crew members
 - (3) NBC personnel
 - (4) Intelligence and Counterintelligence personnel
 - (5) Communications/Electronics personnel
 - e. Captured Documents. The primary sources of captured enemy documents are:
 - (1) Captured Personnel both military and civilians
 - (2) Captured enemy CP's and Installations
 - (3) Enemy dead
 - (4) Captured enemy vehicles and equipment
 - (5) All captured enemy documents from whatever sources will be placed in a Captured Document Envelope and immediately forwarded to the Bn S-2.
 - f. Captured equipment. All captured enemy equipment will be tagged with a completed Captured Equipment Tag as provided and forwarded to the BLT S-2 as soon as possible.
 - (1) The below listed types of captured material and equipment of special intelligence interest and must be evacuated to the S-2 immediately:
 - (a) Soviet and ChiCom/North Korean manufactured arms and equipment.
 - (b) Communications/Electronic Equipment.
 - (c) Aircraft and missiles and/or their related components.
 - (d) NBC equipment.
 - (2) Items of captured equipment will not be maintained as souvenirs but will be forwarded to the S-2 for intelligence processing. When items cease to be of an intelligence value they will be returned to the capturing individual.
5. MAPS, CHARTS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
- a. Standard Reference Maps: (See Ref (a))

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- b. Aerial photographs will be distributed as they become available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

- a. The following counterintelligence measures will be implemented by all units:
- (1) Utilize maximum concealment and maintain high standards of camouflage and march, light and noise discipline.
 - (2) Re-iterate Code of Conduct responsibilities for all personnel in case of possible capture.
 - (3) Maintain strict physical control of classified material and limit access to a strict "need to know" basis.
 - (4) Comply with communications security measures.
 - (5) Immediately report to the S-2 the loss or compromise of classified material.

b. Challenge and Password

- (1) Challenge and Passwords, unless compromised or otherwise changed will be in effect for a 24 hour period, normally 1200 to 1200 local time.
- (2) The BLT S-2 will be immediately notified when compromise of the Challenge and Password is suspected.
- (3) See Appendix 2.

- c. Only those civilian news correspondents and photographers specifically authorized by Commander Amphibious Task Force will be allowed in the objective area.

7. REPORTS

- a. Reporting of any and all information with regard to the enemy must be continuous by all units to this headquarters (Attn S-2). Reports must be forwarded by the most expeditious means possible and be in the form of the key word SALUTE:

S - Size of enemy force in numbers.
A - Action that has taken place including direction of enemy withdrawal
L - Location.
U - Enemy unit designation if known.
T - Time action took place.
E - Equipment of enemy.

- b. Special reports will be submitted on request from this headquarters.

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APPENDIXES

1. Intelligence Estimate (To be issued)
2. Challenge and Password (To be published)
3. Astronomical and Tidal Data

DISTRIBUTION: Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-67.

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800 Sept 1966Appendix 2 (Challenge and Password) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
Operation Order 328-67.1. Codes for the effective Challenge and Passwords will be disseminated
by message for a ten (10) day period to cover twenty-four (24) hour periods
from 1201H to 1200H.

<u>CODE</u>	<u>PRIMARY CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>	<u>ALTERNATE CHALLENGE</u>	<u>PASSWORD</u>
7	BROOKLYN	DODGER	FAST	CAR
44	CHINA	DOLL	HI	HO
21	BIG	GIRL	TWENTY	TWENTY
53	SAD	SACK	SEAT	BELT
75	RED	DOG	BAD	BOY
66	COOL	WATER	BUFFALO	BILL
34	DARK	NIGHT	HIGH	TIDE
46	FORD	CAR	BLACK	WHITE
22	CONEY	ISLAND	GOLD	SILVER
31	JUNE	NIGHT	PURPLE	HEART
55	JULY	FOURTH	FIFTY	FIFTY
77	WHISKEY	COKE	GIN	GINGER
74	SCARE	CROW	PIG	IRON
24	COLUMBUS	DAY	CHRISTMAS	EVE
36	TWELVE	O'CLOCK	SILVER	STAR
42	BILLY	GOAT	RED	FOX
58	SILVER	MINT	RACCOON	COAT
69	ROARING	TWENTIES	SPORTS	MAN


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<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMT</u>	<u>SR</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>ES</u>	<u>IP</u>	<u>HIGH TIDE</u>	<u>FT</u>	<u>LOW TIDE</u>	<u>FT</u>
29	0553	0644	1842	1841	0616	Full	1528	2.8	0745	1.1
30	0553	0644	1841	1913	0702	Full	1547	2.5	0929	1.3



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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800 September 1966Appendix 3 (Astronomical and Tidal Data) to Annex B (Intelligence) to
Operation Order 328-67.1. Astronomical and Tidal Data for the period of 12-30 September 1966, is
as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BMNT</u>	<u>SR</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>MR</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>MP</u>	<u>HIGH TIDE</u>	<u>FT</u>	<u>LOW TIDE</u>	<u>FT</u>
12	0548	0639	1857	0350	1706	Last	1348	3.7	0346	.4
13	0549	0640	1856	0457	1805	New	1441	3.7	0455	.4
14	0549	0640	1855	0601	1850	New	1534	3.5	0621	.6
15	0549	0640	1854	0702	1932	New	1629	3.1	0805	.7
16	0550	0641	1854	0805	2016	1st	1726	2.7	0956	1.0
17	0550	0641	1853	0906	2100	1st	2348 1836	1.2 2.3	1135	1.2
18	0550	0641	1852	1006	2145	1st	1333	1.5	0127	2.4
19	0550	0641	1851	1107	2233	2nd	2131	1.3	0401	2.6
20	0550	0641	1851	1207	2324	2nd	2248	0.9	0607	2.8
21	0550	0641	1850	1306	0017	2nd	2346	0.6	0748	3.0
22	0550	0641	1849	1401	0012	$\frac{1}{2}$			0931	3.7
23	0550	0641	1848	1452	0112	$\frac{1}{2}$	1057	3.5	0040	.6
24	0550	0641	1847	1540	0206	$\frac{1}{2}$	1208	3.5	0135	0.4
25	0551	0642	1846	1621	0301	3rd	1306	3.5	0231	0.6
26	0551	0642	1845	1659	0351	3rd	1352	3.5	0330	0.6
27	0551	0642	1845	1734	0441	3rd	1430	3.3	0430	0.8
28	0552	0643	1843	1814	0529	Full	1502	3.0	0554	1.0

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110000H September 1966

Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: FMFM 6-3

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

a. This plan provides for:

- (1) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by helicopter in Landing Zones to be designated.
- (2) Landing two reinforced companies with designated supporting units by surface means over Beach to be designated.
- (3) See Appendixes for detailed instructions.

2. SHIP-TO-SHORE CONTROL. TacLog Group representation will be provided in accordance with Annex I (Logistics).APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Landing Craft Availability Table
- 2 - Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table
- 3 - Helicopter Availability Table
- 4 - Landing Diagram
- 5 - Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table
- 6 - Serial Assignment Table
- 7 - Helicopter Employment and Assault Landing Table (To be issued)
- 8 - Helicopter Wave and Serial Assignment Table
- 9 - Helicopter Landing Diagram (To be issued)
- 10 - Assault Schedule

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Appendix 1 (Landing Craft Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)
 to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

SHIP	LCM-6	LCM-8
LPD-2	3	2
LSD-28	3	4
Total	6	6
Spares	1	0
Naval Requirement	1	0
Total Naval Requirement	2	0
Total Available to Landing Force	4	6



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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Appendix 2 (Amphibian Vehicle Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

SHIP	AMPHIBIAN VEHICLE UNIT	NUMBER & TYPE		REMARKS
		AMPHIBIAN VEHICLES	LVTP-5 LVTC LARC	
LPD-2	1st Plt, Co A, 5th AmTrac En, FMF	9	1	
LSL-28	Det, BMU-1		1	



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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Appendix 3 (Helicopter Availability Table) to Annex D (Landing Plan)
 to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: FMFM 3-3

Time Zone: H

HELICOPTER UNIT AND DESIGNATION	NUMBER OF A/C	A/C AVAILABLE		TYPE CARRIER	DECK LAUNCH CAPACITY	REMARKS
		FIRST TRIP	OTHER TRIPS			
HMM 363 DUNBAR	24	20	20	UH-34D LPH-2	10	



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 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Appendix 4 (Landing Diagram) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to
 Operation Order 328-67

H-hour: To be designated

Beach: BLUE

Wave 1 Co C (Rein)
 H-hour
 X* X X (X) X X X X X X Ser: 100
 1-0 1-1 1-2 0-2 1-3 1-4 1-5 1-6 1-7 1-8

Wave 2 Co A (Rein)
 H+4
 O O* O Ser: 102
 2-2 2-1 2-3

Wave 3 SF Plt (-)
 H+10 Recon Party, Btry A
 Beachmaster Unit (-)
 O O* (O) Ser: 302
 3-2 3-1 3-3 374
 381

LEGEND:

- X LVTP-5 O LCM(8)
- (X) LVTC (O) LARC
- O LCM(6) * Wave Cmdr

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BLF 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Appendix 5 (Landing Craft and Amphibian Vehicle Assignment Table)
 to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-67

<u>BOAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATION</u>
	1st WAVE		<u>COLUMN</u>
1-0	1st Sqd 1st Plt, Co C	13	
LVTP	PltGd, Co C	1	
	1st Asslt Sqd, Co C	7	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	X*
	MG SecLdr, Co C	1	1-0
	Breeching Tm, 2Sqd, EngrPlt	<u>6</u>	X
		29	1-1
			X
			1-2
1-1	2Sqd 1Plt Co C	13	(X)
LVTP	1PltCmdr Co C	1	0-2
	Msgrs, Co C	2	X
	1MGSqd Co C	9	1-3
	Mortar Sqd, Co C	<u>4</u>	X
		29	1-4
			X
1-2	3Sqd 1Plt Co C	13	1-5
LVTP	1PltSgt Co C	1	X
	1Sqd 3Sec 81 Mortar Plt	9	1-6
	Corpsman Co C	<u>1</u>	X
		24	1-7
			X
0-2	CO, Co C	1	1-8
LVTC	Radiomen, Co C	2	
	NGF Spot Tm	7	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
	WpnsPltCmdr Co C	1	
	Driver, Co C	<u>1</u>	
		13	
1-3	1Sqd 3Plt Co C	13	
LVTP	1FAC Tm	5	
	3PltSgt, Co C	1	
	3Asslt Sqd Co C	8	
	3Mortar Sqd, Co C	4	
	Corpsman, Co C	<u>1</u>	
		32	
1-4	2Sqd, 3Plt, Co C	13	
LVTP	FO Tm, Btry A	5	
	3PltCmdr, Co C	1	

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<u>PCAT NO</u>	<u>PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>BOAT SPACES</u>	<u>FORMATION</u>
1-4	Msgrs, Co C	2	
LVTP	3MG Sqd, Co C	9	
(cont'd)	3PltGd, Co C	1	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
		<u>32</u>	
1-5	3Sqd, 3Plt, Co C	13	
LVTP	XO, Co C	1	
	Chief Clerk, Co C	1	
	CoGySgt, Co C	1	
	Supply Sgt, Co C	1	
	1st Sgt, Co C	1	
	Msgrs, Co C	2	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
	Clerks, Co C	2	
	WpnsPltSgt, Co C	1	
	3FO Tm 81 Mortar	2	
	Asslt Tm, 2Sqd, Engr Plt	6	
		<u>32</u>	
1-6	1Sqd, 2Plt, Co C	13	
LVTP	2PltSgt, Co C	1	
	2Sqd, 3Sec, 81mm Mortar	9	
	3SecLdr, 81mm Mortar	1	
	1Sqd (-), Engr Plt	6	
	Corpsman	1	
		<u>31</u>	
1-7	2Sqd, 2Plt, Co C	13	
LVTP	2PltCmdr, Co C	1	
	Msgrs, Co C	2	
	2MG Sqd, Co C	8	
	Corpsman, Co C	1	
	Asslt SecLdr, Co C	1	
	Mortar SecLdr, Co C	1	
		<u>27</u>	
1-8	3Sqd, 2Plt, Co C	13	
LVTP	2PltGd, Co C	1	
	2Asslt Sqd, Co C	6	
	HST, SP Plt	4	
	2Mortar Sqd, Co C	4	
		<u>28</u>	

2nd WAVE

WEDGE

2-1	CO, Co A	1		0*
LCM-6	Co GySgt, Co A	1		2-1
	WpnsPltCmdr, Co A	1		0
			0	2-3
			2-2	

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BLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966Appendix 8 (Heliteam Wave and Serial Assignment Table) to
Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation Order 328-67

WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT() PERS EQUIP TOTAL		
1	101	1SqdLdr, 1Plt	1	1350	1350	TBA
	101-1	Gren, 1Sqd, 1Plt	1			
		1FT, 1Sqd All Co D	4 6			
1	102	1PltCmdr	1	1350	25	1375
	101-2	1PltRadioman	1	PRC-25 (25)		
		1SqdLdr, MG, Wpns	1			
		2FT, 1Sqd, 1Plt All Co D	3 6			
1	103	3FT, 1Sqd, 1Plt	3	1350	110	1460
	101-3	1FT(-), 1Sqd	3	600 Rds		
		MG, Wpns, All Co D	6	(58)		
1	104	2SqdLdr, 1Plt	1	1350		1350
	101-4	Gren, 2Sqd, 1Plt	1			
		1FT, 2Sqd, 1Plt	4			
		All Co D	6			
1	105	1PltGd	1	400 Rds	35	1385
	101-5	1PltCorpsman	1	(35)		
		A-Man, 1FT, 1Sqd	1			
		MG, Wpns				
		2FT, 2Sqd, 1Plt All Co D	3 6			
1	106	3FT, 2Sqd, 1Plt	3	1350	110	1460
	101-6	2Tm(-), 1Sqd	3	600 Rds		
		MG, Wpns, All Co D	6	(58)		
1	107	3SqdLdr, 1Plt	1	1350		1350
	101-7	Gren, 3Sqd, 1Plt	1			
		1FT, 3Sqd, 1Plt	4			
		All Co D	6			
1	108	2FT, 3Sqd, 1Plt	3	400 Rds	35	1385
	101-8	1PltSgt	1	(35)		
		1PltCorpsman	1			
		A-Man, 2Tm, 1Sqd	1			
		All Co D	6			
1	109	3FT, 3Sqd, 1Plt	3	2 PRC-25	50	1400
	101-9	CO	1	(50)		
		Radioman	2			
		All Co D	6			
1	110	FO Tm (-)	2	PRC-25(25)	25	1375
	101-10	EngrSqd (-)	3			
		WpnsPltCmdr, Co D	1			
			6			

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		SUPPLIES AND WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS EQUIP TOTAL	
1	111 101-11	FAC Tm #2	6	PRC-25(25) PRC-41(45) PRC-47(90)	1350 160 1510	TBA
1	112 101-12	2SqdLdr, 2Plt Gren, 2Sqd, 2Plt 2FT, 2Sqd, 2Plt All Co D	1 1 4 6		1350 1350	
1	113 101-13	2PltCmndr 2PltRadioman 2SqdLdr, MG, Wpns 1FT, 2Sqd, 2Plt All Co D	1 1 1 3 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	
1	114 101-14	3FT, 2Sqd, 2Plt 1Tm(-), 2Sqd, MG All Co D	3 3 6	MG (52) 600 Rds (58)	1350 110 1460	
1	115 101-15	3SqdLdr, 2Plt Gren, 3Sqd, 2Plt 1FT, 3Sqd, 2Plt All Co D	1 1 4 6		1350 1350	
1	116 101-16	2PltGd 2Plt Corpsman A-Man, 1Tm, 1MG Sqd 2FT, 3Sqd, 2Plt All Co D	1 1 1 3 6	400 Rds (35)	1350 35 1385	
2	201 201-1	3FT, 3Sqd, 2Plt 2Tm(-), 2MG Sqd All Co D	3 3 6		1350 1350	
2	202 201-2	1Sqd, 60mm Mortar Sect, Wpns Flt 60mmMorSecLdr, Wpns Flt, All Co D	5 1 6	60mm w/BA (155)	1350 155 1505	
2	203 201-3	2Sqd, 60mm Mor Corpsman All WpnsFlt, Co D	5 1 6	60mm w/BA (155)	1350 155 1505	
2	204 201-4	3Sqd, 60mm Mor PltSgt Radioman All WpnsFlt, Co D	4 1 1 6	60mm w/BA (155) PRC-25(25)	1350 180 1530	
2	205 201-5	CoGySgt, Co D Mgr, Co D Asslt Tm (-), 3Sqd 1Plt, Co A, Engr A-Man, 2Tm, 2Sqd, MG Sec, WpnsFlt,	1 1 3 1 6	400 Rds (35)	1350 35 1385	

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL		SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()		ENPLAN-ING STATION
	SERIAL NO	TROOP UNIT	NO			PERS	EQUIP TOTAL	
2	206	1SqdLdr, 2Flt	1			1350	1350	TBA
	201-6	Gren, 1Sqd, 2Flt 1FF, 1Sqd, 2Flt All Co D	1 4 6					
2	207	2FF, 1Sqd, 2Flt	4		3.5 w/4Rds	1350 60	1410	
	201-7	1Tm(-), 1Sqd, Asslt Sec, WpnsFlt All Co D	2 6		(60)			
2	208	3FF, 1Sqd, 2Flt	4			1350	1350	
	201-8	A-Man, 1Tm 1Sqd, AssltSec, WpnsFlt 1SqdLdr, AssltSec, WpnsFlt, All Co D	1 6					
2	209	1Tm, 3Sqd, MG Sec	4			1350	1350	
	201-9	WpnsFlt 2FltSgt 2FltCorpsman All Co D	1 1 1 6					
2	210	1SqdLdr, 3Flt	1			1350	1350	
	201-10	1FF, 1Sqd, 3Flt 3FltCorpsman All Co D	4 1 6					
2	211	2FF, 1Sqd, 3Flt	4		3.5 w/4Rds	1350 60	1410	
	201-11	1Tm(-), 2Sqd, Asslt Sec; All Co D	2 6		(60)			
2	212	3FF, 1Sqd, 3Flt	4			1350	1350	
	201-12	A-Man, 1Tm, 2Sqd AssltSec, WpnsFlt 2SqdLdr, AssltSec All Co D	1 1 1 6					
2	213	2Tm, 3Sqd, MG Sec	4		MG (52)	1350 145	1495	
	201-13	WpnsFlt 3FltSgt AssltSecLdr, Wpns All Co D	1 1 1 6		1000 Rds (93)			
2	214	FO Tm(-) A/1/13	3		IRC-25(25)	1350 85	1435	
	201-14	2Tm, 1Sqd, AssltSec XO, Co D	2 1 6		3.5 w/4Rds (60)			
2	215	FO, 81 Flt, H&S Co	2		IRC-25(25)	1350 85	1435	
	201-15	2Tm, 2Sqd, AssltSec Mesgr, Co D	2 2 6		3.5 w/4Rds (60)			
2	216	7Sqd, 81mm Mor	6		81mm Mor	1350 235	1585	
	201-16	H&S Co			(115) 12Rds(120)			

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WAVE	HELITEAM FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES AND WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
			NO	EQUIPMENT	PERE EQUIP TOTAL	
3	301 301-1	8Sqd, 81mm Mor H&S Co	6	81mm Mor (115) 12Rds(120)	1350 235 1585	TBA
3	302 301-2	Hq, 4Sec, 81mm Mor	6	PRC-25(25) 24Rds(240)	1350 240 1590	
3	303 301-3	2SqdLdr, 3Plt 3SqdLdr, MG Sec 1FT, 2Sqd, 3Plt All Co D	1 1 4 6		1350 1350	
3	304 301-4	2FT, 2Sqd, 3Plt 3PltCmdr 3PltRadioman All Co D	4 1 1 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	
3	305 301-5	3FT, 2Sqd, 3Plt 3PltGd 3PltCorpsman All Co D	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
3	306 301-6	1Tm, 3Sqd, AssltSec A-Man, 1Tm, 3Sqd Supply Sgt Driver All Co D	3 1 1 1 6	3.5 w/4Rds (60) 400 Rds MG (35)	1350 95 1445	
3	307 301-7	3SqdLdr, 3Plt 1FT, 3Sqd, 3Plt A-Man, 2Tm, 3MG Sqd All Co D	1 4 1 6	400 Rds (35)	1350 35 1385	
3	308 301-8	2FT, 3Sqd, 3Plt 1Tm(-), 3Sqd, MG All Co D	3 3 6	MG(52) 600 Rds (58)	1350 110 1460	
3	309 301-9	1st Sgt, Co D Chief Corpsman, HST	1 1 4 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	
3	310 301-10	3FT, 3Sqd, 3Plt 2Tm, 3Sqd, AssltSec All Co D	4 2 6	3.5 w/4Rds (60)	1350 60 1410	
3	311 301-11	2Tm(-) 3Sqd, MG 3SqdLdr, AssltSec Clerk MG SqdLdr All Co D	3 1 1 1 6	MG(52) 600 Rds (58)	1350 110 1460	
3	312 301-12	Breach Tm, 3Sqd 1Plt, Co A, Engr	6		1350 1350	

SECRET-NOFORN

WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT(PERS EQUIP TOTAL)	
3	313 301-13	CO S-3 S-2 CommO Radioman	1 1 1 1 2	3 IRC-25 (90)	1350 90 1440	TBA
3	314 301-14	S-4 SF Radioman Radioman	1 1 4	2 IRC-25 (60) IRC-47(93)	1350 153 1503	
3	315 301-15	S-4 Chief NGF Ln Tm (-)	1 4	4 BB-451 (68)	1125 236 1361	
			5	IRC-25(30) IRC-41(45) IRC-47(93)		
3	316 301-16	ArtyLnTm (-) OpsChief Radioman	3 1 2	2 RC-292 (80) IRC-25(30)	1350 110 1460	
			6			
4	401 401-1	AirLnTm (-)	5	4 BB-451 (68) IRC-25(30) IRC-41(45) IRC-47(93) RC-292(40)	1125 276 1401	
4	402 401-2	HqCmnd S-3LnO H&S CoGySgt S-3 Clerk S-2 Clerk S-1	1 1 1 1 1 1		1350 1350	
			6			
4	403 401-3	1FT, 1Sqd, 1Plt 1PltCorpsman 1PltSgt CoGySgt All Co B	3 1 1 1 1		1350 1350	
			6			
4	404 401-4	2FT, 1Sqd, 1Plt 2AssltTm, 1Sqd, Wpn Plt; All Co B	3 3 6	3.5 w/BA (49)	1350 49 1399	
4	405 401-5	3FT, 1Sqd, 1Plt 1SqdLdr, 1Plt Gren, 1Sqd, 1Plt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
4	406 401-6	1MGTm, 1Sqd, Wpns 1MGSqdLdr, WpnsPlt 1PltCorpsman All Co B	4 1 1 6	MG(57.5) BA(82.5)	1350 140 1490	

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WAVE	HELITEAM		NO	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT			PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
4	407 401-7	1MorSqd,WpnsFlt 1PltCmdr 1PltRadioman All Co B	4 1 1 6	60mm w/BA (144) PRC-25(25)	1350	169	1519	TBA
4	408 401-8	1FT,2Sqd,1Plt 2SqdLdr,1Plt Gren,2Sqd,1Plt 1RktSqdLdr,Wpns Plt; All Co B	3 1 1 1 6		1350		1350	
4	409 401-9	1AssltTm,1Sqd,Wpn 3FT,2Sqd,1Plt All Co B	2 4 6	3.5 w/BA (49)	1350	49	1399	
4	410 401-10	CoCmdr, Co B Radioman, Co B ArtyFO Tm 1/13	1 2 3 6	3 PRC-25 (75)	1350	75	1425	
4	411 401-11	2FT,2Sqd,1Plt 2MGTm,1Sqd,Wpns Flt; All Co B	3 3 6	MG w/BA (140)	1350	140	1490	
4	412 401-12	1FT,3Sqd,1Plt 1PltGd WpnsPltSgt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350	
4	413 401-13	2FT,3Sqd,1Plt 3SqdLdr,1Plt Gren,3Sqd,1Plt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350	
4	414 401-14	3FT,3Sqd,1Plt MorSecLdr,WpnsPlt AmmoNCO,WpnsPlt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350	
4	415 401-15	1FT,1Sqd,3Plt 3PltSgt 3PltCorpsman All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350	
4	416 401-16	2FT,1Sqd,3Plt 1SqdLdr,3Plt Gren,1Sqd,3Plt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350	
5	501 501-1	3FT,1Sqd,3Plt 2AssltTm,3Sqd,Wpn Flt; All Co B	3 3 6	3.5 w/BA (49)	1350	49	1399	
5	502 501-2	1MGTm,3Sqd,Wpns 3MGSqdLdr,WpnsPlt MGSecLdr,WpnsPlt All Co B	4 1 1 6	MG w/BA (140)	1350	140	1490	
5	503 501-3	1FT,2Sqd,3Plt 2SqdLdr,3Plt Gren,2Sqd,3Plt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350		1350	

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5

SECRET-NOFORN

HELITEAM		PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES		WEIGHT()		ENPLAN- ING TOTAL STATION
WAVE	FLIGHT SERIAL NO		NO	EQUIPMENT	PERS	EQUIP	
5	504 501-4	3FT, 2Sqd, 3Plt 1 Asslt Tm, 3Sqd, Wpn Plt; All Co B	3 $\frac{3}{6}$	3.5 w/BA (49)	1350	49	1399 TBA
5	505 501-5	2FT, 2Sqd, 3Plt 3 Asslt Sqd Ldr, Wpns 3 Plt Corpsman All Co B	4 1 $\frac{1}{6}$		1350		1350
5	506 501-6	3 Mor Sqd, Wpns Plt 3 Plt Cmdr 3 Plt Radioman All Co B	4 1 1 $\frac{1}{6}$	60mm w/BA (144) IRC-25(25)	1350	169	1519
5	507 501-7	1 FT, 3Sqd, 3Plt 3 Plt Gd All Co B	4 $\frac{1}{5}$		1125		1125
5	508 501-8	2 FT, 3Sqd, 3Plt 3 Sqd Ldr, 3Plt Gren, 3Sqd, 3Plt All Co B	4 1 $\frac{1}{6}$		1350		1350
5	509 501-9	Wpns Plt Cmdr Wpns Plt Corpsman Wpns Plt Radioman 2 FO Tm, 81mm, H&S	1 1 1 $\frac{2}{5}$	2 IRC-25 (50)	1125	50	1175
5	510 501-10	3 FT, 3Sqd, 3Plt 2 MG Tm, 3Sqd, Wpns Plt; All Co B	3 $\frac{3}{6}$	MG w/BA (140)	1350	140	1490
5	511 501-11	1 Sqd Ldr, 2 Sec, 81mm Mortar H&S Co	5 $\frac{5}{5}$	81mm Mor 24 Rds(335)	1125	335	1460
5	512 501-12	2 Sqd, 2 Sec, 81mm Mortar H&S Co	5 $\frac{5}{5}$	81mm Mor 24 Rds(355)	1125	355	1470
5	513 501-13	81 Sec Ldr Wireman Field Radioman Ammo Cpl Ammo-Man	1 1 1 1 $\frac{1}{5}$	IRC-25(25) RollWire (35)	1125	60	1185
5	514 501-14	HST Tm Supply & Prop NCO Co B	4 $\frac{1}{5}$	IRC-25 (25)	1125	25	1150
5	515 501-15	1 FT, 1Sqd, 2Plt 1 Sqd Ldr, 2Plt Gren, 1Sqd, 2Plt All Co B	4 1 $\frac{1}{6}$		1350		1350

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT(PERS EQUI TOTAL	
5	516 501-16	2FT, 1Sqd, 2Plt 2PltCorpsman 2PltSgt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	TEA
6	601 601-1	3FT, 1Sqd, 2Plt 2AssltTm, 2Sqd, Wpn Plt; All Co B	4 2 6	3.5 w/BA (49)	1350 49 1399	
6	602 601-2	2MorSqd, WpnsPlt 2PltCmdr 2PltRadioman CoClerk All Co B	3 1 1 1 6	60mm w/BA (144) FRC-25(25)	1350 169 1519	
6	603 601-3	1MG Tm, 2Sqd 2SqdLdr, MG Sec AssltSecLdr All WpnsPlt, Co B	4 1 1 6	MG w/BA (140)	1350 140 1490	
6	604 601-4	1FT, 2Sqd, 2Plt 2AssltSqdLdr, Wpns 2PltCorpsman All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
6	605 601-5	1AssltTm, 2Sqd, Wpn 2FT, 2Sqd, 2Plt All Co B	3 2 6	3.5 w/BA (49)	1350 49 1399	
6	606 601-6	3FT, 2Sqd, 2Plt 2SqdLdr, 2Plt Gren, 2Sqd, 2Plt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
6	607 601-7	Engrs	6 3 6	FRC-25(25) 3 Satchel Charges(60)	1350 85 1435	
6	608 601-8	Engrs	6 3 6	3 Satchel Charges(60)	1350 60 1410	
6	609 601-9	1FT, 3Sqd, 2Plt 2PltGd 1stSgt CoClerk All Co B	3 1 1 1 6		1350 1350	
6	610 601-10	2FT, 3Sqd, 2Plt 2MG Tm, 2Sqd, Wpns Plt; All Co B	3 2 6	MG w/BA (140)	1350 140 1490	
6	611 601-11	3FT, 3Sqd, 2Plt 3SqdLdr, 2Plt Gren, 3Sqd, 2Plt All Co B	4 1 1 6		1350 1350	
6	612 601-12	XO, Co B FO Tm A/1/13 Radioman, Co B Co Corpsman, Co B	1 2 2 1 6	3 FRC-25 (75)	1350 75 1425	

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3

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	NO	AND EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT(PERS EQUIP TOTAL)	
6	613 601-13	ComaChief Radioman MsgCen	1 3 2 6	2 PRC-47 (93) 4 BB-451 (68)	1350 161 1511	TBA
6	614 601-14	Wiremen	6	5 TA-312 5 MX-306 (180) 1 SB-22(32)	1350 212 1562	
6	615 601-15	Radiomen Wiremen MsgCen Tech	2 2 1 1 6	2 IRC-25 (52) 3 RC-292 (144) 2BB451(34)	1350 230 1580	
6	616 601-16	WireChief Wiremen	1 5 6	5TA-312 5MX-306 (180) SD-22(32)	1350 212 1562	
7	701 701-1	ArtyLnTmRadMan Radiomen Radioman NGF	1 4 1 6	5 PRC-25 (125) LN/GR-39 (22)	1350 147 1497	
7	702 701-2	BnMedO Corpsmen S-4 Radioman XO, H&S Co S-3 NBC NCO	1 2 1 1 1 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	
7	703 701-3	S-3 Clerks H&S Radioman Interpreter S-1 H&S CoClerks	2 1 1 2 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	
7	704 701-4	1stSgt, H&S Co S-4 Clerks H&S Co SupplyNCO	1 4 1 6		1350 1350	
7	705 701-5	Radioman, NGF Engr1tSgt HST (-)	2 1 3 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	
7	706 701-6	S-1 Clerks CO & XO Drivers	4 2 6		1350 1350	
7	707 701-7	Engr1tHc HST Tm (-) Corpsman Photographer	3 1 1 1 6	PRC-25(25)	1350 25 1375	

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()			ENL LAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT		PERS	EQUIP	TOTAL	
7	708	ITT	4	1350		1350	TBA
	701-8	S-2 Clerks	$\frac{2}{6}$				
7	709	S-4 Clerk	1	RC-292(40)	1190 65	1255	
	701-9	Radioman ALO	1	PRC-25(25)			
		SgtMaj	1				
		81mmFSCC Reprs	$\frac{2}{5}$				
7	710	SecPltCmdr	1	PRC-25(25)	1350 135	1485	
	701-10	PltRadioman	1	MG(58)			
		1SqdLdr	1	600Rds(52)			
		MG Tm (-)	$\frac{3}{6}$				
7	711	2FT, 1Sqd	4		1350	1350	
	701-11	3FT(-), 2Sqd	$\frac{2}{6}$				
7	712	2SqdLdr	1	MG(58)	1350 110	1460	
	701-12	MG Tm, 2Sqd	4	600Rds(52)			
		2FT(-), 2Sqd	$\frac{1}{6}$				
7	713	2FT (-), 2Sqd	2		1350	1350	
	701-13	3FT, 2Sqd	$\frac{4}{6}$				
7	714	SecPltGd	1	PRC-25(25)	1350 26	1376	
	701-14	SecPltMsgr	1				
		PltCorpsman	1				
		MG Tm(-), 1Sqd	1				
		3FT (-), 1Sqd	1				
		3FT (-), 4Sqd	$\frac{1}{6}$				
7	715	3SqdLdr	1	MG(58)	1350 110	1460	
	701-15	MG Tm, 3Sqd	4	600Rds(52)			
		2FT (-), 3Sqd	$\frac{1}{6}$				
7	716	2FT(-), 3Sqd	2		1350	1350	
	701-16	3FT, 3Sqd	$\frac{4}{6}$				
8	801	4SqdLdr	1	MG(58)	1350 110	1460	
	801-1	MG Tm 4Sqd	4	600Rds(52)			
		2FT(-) 4Sqd	$\frac{1}{6}$				
8	802	SecPltSgt	1		1350	1350	
	801-2	2FT, 4Sqd	4				
		3FT(-), 4Sqd	$\frac{1}{6}$				
8	803	1Sqd, 81mm MorPlt	5	Mor(115)	1125 275	1400	
	801-3		$\frac{1}{5}$	16Rds(160)			

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SECRET-NOFORN

WAVE	HELI TEAM FLIGHT		PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	SERIAL NO			NO	WEIGHT() PERS EQUIP TOTAL		
8	804 801-4		2Sqd, 81mmPlt(-)	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	TBA
8	805 801-5		1SecLdr 81Flt Hdqs 1Sec FltCmdr 81Flt	1 4 1	PRC-25(25) 8Rds(80) Wire(20)	1350 125 1475	
8	806 801-6		AsstPltCmdr Hdqs 81Flt AmmoMan	1 4 1 6	16Rds(160) PRC-25(25) Wire(20) FDC Eqp(20)	1350 225 1575	
8	807 801-7		3Sqd(-) 81Flt	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	
8	808 801-8		4Sqd(-) 81Flt	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	
8	809 801-9		2SecLdr SecHqs	1 5 6	PRC-25(25) Wire(20) 8Rds(80)	1350 125 1475	
8	810 801-10		5Sqd(-) 81Flt	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	
8	811 801-11		6Sqd(-) 81Flt	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	
8	812 801-12		3SecLdr SecHqs	1 4 5	PRC-25(25) 16Rds(160) Wire(20)	1125 205 1330	
8	813 801-13		AmmoMan 81FltCmdr Radioman	4 1 1 6	16Rds(160) PRC-25(25)	1350 185 1535	
8	814 801-14		7Sqd(-) 81Flt	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	
8	815 801-15		8Sqd(-) 81Flt	5 - 5	Mor(115) 16Rds(160)	1125 275 1400	
8	816 801-16		MPO MT Men	1 5 6		1350 1350	

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WAVE	HELITELM		SUPPLIES			ENLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT() PERS EQUIP TOTAL		
9	901	MT Chief	1	MG(45)	1350 45	1395 TBA
	901-1	Machine gunner MT Men	1 4			
			6			
9	902	SecChief	1	MG(45)	1350 45	1395
	901-2	Machine Gunner MT Men	1 4			
			6			
9	903	SecChief	1		1350	1350
	901-3	MT Men	5			
			6			
9	904	SecChief	1		1350	1350
	901-4	MT Men	5			
			6			
9	905	MT Man	1		1125	1125
	901-5	HST Men	4			
			5			
9	906	SecurChief	1	MG(35)	1350 35	1385
	901-6	MachineGunner Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 4			
			6			
9	907	MT NCO	1	PRC-25(25)	1350 60	1410
	901-7	Radioman MG Man Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 3	MG(35)		
			6			
9	908	XO	1	PRC-25(25)	1350 25	1375
	901-8	Radioman FDC man Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 3			
			6			
9	909	GySgt	1		1350	1350
	901-9	Wiremen FDC Man Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 3			
			6			
9	910	CO	1	PRC-25(25)	1350 25	1375
	901-10	OpsChief Radioman CO's Driver Riflemen 107mmMorBtry	1 1 1 2			
			6			
9	911	SecChief	1	SecGear	1350 80	1430
	901-11	Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	5	(80)		
			6			
9	912	SecChief	1	SecGear	1350 80	1430
	901-12	Cannoneers 107mmMorBtry	5	(80)		
			6			

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WAVE	HELITEAM	PERSONNEL	SUPPLIES	WEIGHT()		ENPLAN-
	FLIGHT			AND	PERS	
SERIAL NO	TROOP	UNIT	NO	EQUIPMENT	TOTAL	STATION
9	913	SecChief	1	SecGear	1350 80	1430 TBA
	901-13	Cannoneers	5	(80)		
		107mmMorBtry	6			
9	914	SecChief	1	SecGear	1350 80	1430
	901-14	Cannoneers	5	(80)		
		107mmMorBtry	6			
9	915	SecChief	1	SecGear	1350 80	1430
	901-15	Cannoneers	5	(80)		
		107mmMorBtry	6			
9	916	SecChief	1	SecGear	1350 80	1430
	901-16	Cannoneers	5	(80)		
		107mmMorBtry	6			
10	1004	107mmMorBtry		107mmMor	1465	1465
	1001-1			(Ext)		
10	1002	107mmMorBtry		107mmMor	1465	1465
	1001-2			(Ext)		
10	1003	107mmMorBtry		107mmMor	1465	1465
	1001-3			(Ext)		
10	1004	107mmMorBtry		107mmMor	1465	1465
	1001-4			(Ext)		
10	1005	107mmMorBtry		107mmMor	1465	1465
	1001-5			(Ext)		
10	1006	107mmMorBtry		107mmMor	1465	1465
	1001-6			(Ext)		
10	1007	FDC	1		1350	1350
	1001-7	FDC Men	2			
		Wireman	1			
		Riflemen	2			
		107mmMorBtry	6			
10	1008	CommChief	1		1350	1350
	1001-8	FDC Men	2			
		Riflemen	3			
		107mmMorBtry	6			
10	1009	107mmMorBtry		Trailer	1400	1400
	1001-9			(Ext)		
10	1010	107mmMorBtry		Trailer	1400	1400
	1001-10			(Ext)		
10	1011	107mmMorBtry		Trailer	1400	1400
	1001-11			(Ext)		

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WAVE	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	SUPPLIES AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT()		EMPLAN- ING STATION
				PERS	EQUIP TOTAL	
10	1012 1001-12	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	TBA
10	1013 1001-13	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	1014 1001-14	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	1015 1001-15	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
10	1016 1001-16	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
11	1101 1101-1	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
11	1102 1101-2	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
11	1103 1101-3	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
11	1104 1101-4	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
11	1105 1101-5	107mmMorBtry	BA (Ext)	1400	1400	
11	1106 1101-6	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400)(Ext)	1300	1300	
11	1107 1101-7	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400)(Ext)	1300	1300	
11	1108 1101-8	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400)(Ext)	1300	1300	
11	1109 1101-9	H&S	CLIW-M274 (900) Supplies (400)(Ext)	1300	1300	

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WAVE	HELITEAM		SUPPLIES			ENPLAN- ING STATION
	FLIGHT SERIAL NO	PERSONNEL TROOP UNIT	AND NO EQUIPMENT	WEIGHT() PERS EQUIP TOTAL		
11	1110 1101-10	H&S	GF Tent	500	500	TBA
11	1111 1101-11	H&S	CP Tents	500	500	
11	1112 1101-12	H&S	Generator (Ext)	450	450	
On Call		XO	1 2 PRC-25	1350	52	1402
		S-3A	1 (52)			
		Radioman	1			
		AstOpsChief	1			
		RadioChief	1			
			<u>6</u>			
On Call			PRC-25(25)	675	25	700
		PlatSgt 81's	1			
		Radioman 81's	1			
		S-2 Chief	1			
			<u>3</u>			

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RLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Appendix 10 (Assault Schedule) to Annex D (Landing Plan) to Operation
 Order 328-67

Ref: NWIP 22-6(A)

Time Zone: H

BEACH	BLUE
WAVE TIME	CRAFT/VEHICLE SERIAL UNIT
1 H-hour	9 LVTP 1 LVTC Ser: 100 Co C (Rein)
2 H+4	3 LCM (6) Ser: 102 Co A (Rein)
3 H+10	2 LCM (8) 1 LARC Ser: 302,385,381 SP Plt(-) BMU Btry A Survey Tm
On Call	2 LCM (8) Ser: 339 Btry A(-)
On Call	2 LCM (8) Ser: 200 AT Plt
On Call	1 LCM (6) Ser: 401 Det, Comm Spt
Non Sched	5 LCM (8) Ser: 305 Tank Plt
Non Sched	1 LCM (6) Ser: 357 H&S Co(-)



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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966

Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: (a) AMS L7014 I, (1:50,000) CAM-LO
 AMS L7014 II, (1:50,000) THON DOC KINH
 AMS L7014 I, (1:50,000) THON NGO XA DONG
 AMS L7014 III, (1:50,000) BA LONG
 AMS L7014 IV, (1:50,000) QUANG TRI
 (b) NWIP 22-7A
 (c) FTEM 7-4
 (d) CL 4 BnO 3000.1 (SOP for FSCC)

Time Zone: H

TASK ORGANIZATION: See Annex A (Task Organization)1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See Current Intelligence Summaries.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Appendix 1 (Artillery)
- (2) Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire)
- (3) Appendix 3 (Air Support)

2. MISSION. BLT 1-26 commencing at H and L hours lands over designated beaches and helicopter landing zones to seize landing force objectives and conduct search and destroy operations in AOA.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations

- (1) Control and coordination of air and naval gunfire initially by CATF (SACC).
- (2) Control and coordination of ground supporting arms by SACC until establishment of FSCC ashore.
- (3) Control and coordination of Naval gunfire passes ashore upon approval by CATF of request submitted by this headquarters through CLF.
- (4) Control and coordination of air remains with CATF.
- (5) Coordination of supporting arms will be returned to SACC prior to commencement of withdrawal.

c.

b. Coordination of Air Support. Close air support requests passed on

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TAR net will be coordinated to the extent that if considered appropriate and safe, the ALO will state "Glimmer 14 Concurs" or "Disapproves". SACC must give positive approval before the request will be honored by TACC.

c. Coordination of Naval Gunfire Support

- (1) During daylight hours following request, the NGF Ship will obtain positive approval from SACC/FSCC on NGF control net before firing a mission.
- (2) Planned night defensive fires will be submitted by NGF spotter to SACC/FSCC for approval prior to darkness. Further approval of individual night firing missions will be "silence is consent".
- (3) All illumination missions must have positive approval from FSCC.
- (4) Unobserved NGF missions may be called when situation requires it. Specified strike zones will be promulgated seperately by COMSUMACV.

d. Coordinating of Artillery Fires.

- (1) During daylight hours effected by SACC/FSCC, including consideration of all air activity.
- (2) For night fires the procedures set forth in paragraph 32.(c).2 and 3 will be utilized.

e. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) D-day Schedule of fires see TAB 2 Appendix 2 to this Annex.
- (2) Target location will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid System, when practical.
- (3) All fires will conform to Rules of Engagement (Annex J)

4. TARGET INFORMATIONa. Concentration Designation System

- (1) The concentration designator for artillery and mortars will be made up of two letters followed by three numbers. The first letter will signify the controlling agency and the second letter will signify the weapon.

UNIT

NGF	1-299
FSCC	300-499
105mm Howitzer	500-599
107mm Howtar	600-699
81mm Mortars	700-799
Spare to be assigned as required	800-999

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(2) Naval gunfire will use prefix "N".

c. Restricted Targets

(1) Class E Targets

Religious Buildings	Utilities	Bridges
National Shrines	Railroads	Tunnels
Museums	Highways	Med Facilities

(2) Destruction of class E targets is prohibited except on approval of SACC/FSCC, or where failure to destroy would seriously jeopardize the mission of the BLT prior to receipt of approval.

(3) Class E targets destroyed will be reported immediately to this headquarters.

5. AIRCRAFT SAFETY

a. Air Sentries and Lookouts

(1) Sentries will be positioned at artillery/mortar positions and will cause the firing units to cease firing when friendly aircraft are observed approaching danger areas.

(2) Artillery forward observers and naval gunfire spotters will cease fire when it appears that the trajectories of artillery and support ships will endanger friendly aircraft.

b. Restrictive Fire Plan

(1) A restrictive fire plan will be employed when required. These plans will be in accordance with reference (d).

(2) The restrictive fire plan, if it is required, will be established by this headquarters. The code name for the plan is "HANGNAIL" and each "PLAN HANGNAIL" will be numbered consecutively with each series beginning at 0001 local time.

c. Helicopter Safety

(1) The Battalion ALO will keep the Fire Support Coordinator informed of the time and location of all scheduled and on call helicopter flights into the combat areas, and which approach and retirement lanes are being utilized.

(2) Unless special coordination procedures are prescribed or required fires on helicopter routes in use are restricted to observed fires where the observer is capable of ensuring the safety of the helicopters using the route.

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- (1) All fires within the AOA will be coordinated by the SACC/FSCC.
- (2) Restricted Fire Zones will be established and promulgated by SACC/FSCC.
- (3) Creeping Fires. Creeping fires will be utilized on all fire missions in close proximity to friendly personnel. Determination as to what constitutes "close proximity" is the responsibility of the infantry unit commanders.
- (4) Sight and Charge Check. Battery commanders and 81mm Mortar Platoon Commander will ensure that section chiefs verify elevations, deflection, charges and sight pictures on all fire missions.

7. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS

a. See Annex F (Comm-Elec)

b. Command PostsAFLOATASHORE

- | | | |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| (1) CTG 79.5 | LPH-2 | ----- |
| (2) BLF 1-26 | LPH-2 | to be announced |
| (3) Subordinate units | submit locations when established. | |



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APPENDIXES

- 1 - Artillery
- 2 - Naval Gunfire
- 3 - Air Support

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966Appendix 1 (Artillery) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to
Operation Order 328-67

Ref: None

Time zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) See Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire).
- (3) See Appendix 3 (Air Support).

2. MISSION

a. Btry A, 1st Bn, 13 Marines, lands by surface means on D-Day in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan) and executes assigned missions in direct support of BLT 1-26.

b. 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12 Marines, lands by helicopter on D-Day in accordance with Annex D and executes assigned missions in direct support of BLT 1-26.

3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Artillery Employment.

(1) Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines after landing by landing craft over designated beach in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), will establish a battery position and provide direct support conventional fires in support of BLT 1-26.

(2) 107mm Mortar Btry (-), 2nd Battalion, 12th Marines after landing by helicopter in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan), will establish a battery position and provide direct support conventional fires in support of BLT 1-26.

b. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Firing Capabilities Reports: The FireCap will be submitted to FSCC by each unit upon initial occupation of position and any subsequent occupation. The FireCap report shall consist of following data:

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- (a) Position location (by checkpoint).
 - (b) Azimuth of fire (Shackled).
- (2) Ammunition Status Reports will be submitted to this headquarters (FSCC) upon request.
- (3) Firing Chart. Grid Sheet 1:25,000.
- (4) Survey. To be provided by Survey Party, Btry A, 1st Bn, 13th Marines as required.
- (5) Priorities of Fire
- (a) Anti-mechanized.
 - (b) Counter battery/counter mortar.
 - (c) Direct fire weapons.
 - (d) Automatic weapons.
 - (e) Observed fires.
 - (f) Unobserved fires.
- (6) Counter-Battery/Counter-Mortars. Semi-Active Policy.
- (7) Azimuth of Fire
- (a) A Btry. To be announced
 - (b) 107mm Mortar Btry: To best support maneuvering units.
- (8) Concentration Numbers. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (9) Meteorological Data - To be promulgated as available.
- (10) Restriction on Fires. See Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (11) Ammunition Restrictions. Units will not expend more than eighty percent of available supply rate without approval of BLP Commander.
- (12) Target Information. Will be promulgated as acquired.
4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS
- a. See Annex I (Logistics).

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b. Available Supply Rate (Rds/wpn/day).

105mm Howitzer	<u>80</u>
107mm Howtar	<u>81</u>

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS

a. See Annex F (Communications-Electronics)

b. Command Post

	<u>AFLOAT</u>	<u>ASHORE</u>
(a) BLT 1-26	LPH-2	To Be Announced
(b) Btry 4	LSD-28	To Be Announced
(c) 107 Mortars	LPH-2	To Be Announced



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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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Appendix 2 (Naval Gunfire Support) to Annex E (Supporting Arms Coordination)
 to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: (a) CTG 76.5 Operation Order 328-67
 (b) Maps: AMS Series L7014; Sheets 6342 I, 6342 II, 6442 I, 6442 III
 6442 IV

(c) FMFM 7-2

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces

1. See Annex B (Intelligence)
2. See Current ISUMS

b. Friendly Forces

1. See Annex A (Task Organization)
2. CTU 76.5.1 provides Naval Gunfire Support

2. MISSION Fire Support Unit supports the landing and operations ashore
 of BLT 1/26 with Naval Gunfire.

3. EXECUTION

a. Ship Assignments

1. USS MULLINIX (DD-944) direct support BLT 1/26
2. USS ST. FRANCIS RIVER (LSMR 525) direct support BLT 1/26
3. USS ST. PAUL (CA-73) will relieve MULLINIX about 16 SEP 66

b. Coordinating Instructions

1. Fire Support Areas in accordance with Tab 1 (Naval Gunfire Support Operations Diagram) to this appendix.
2. Priority of Fires and priority of attack of targets in accordance with ref (c).
3. D-Day schedule of fires in accordance with Tab 2 (D-Day Schedule of Fires) to this appendix.
4. Relief of Fire Support Ships as directed by CTG 76.5

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5. Standard Salvos for call fires.
 - a. 5-inch 2 guns, 4 salvos or 1 gun, 8 salvos
 - b. 5-inch SSR 2 guns, 4 salvos
 - c. 8-inch 2 guns, 2 salvos or 1 gun, 4 salvos
6. Unless otherwise specified in call fire, one gun will be used for adjustment of all fires.
7. Illumination missions will be fired only upon approval of the Battalion Commander.
8. Smoke will be employed only on request of the supported unit.
9. Coordination of Supporting Arms in accordance with Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
10. All Naval Gunfire missions will be positively approved by SACC/FSCC
11. Safety Measures:
 - (a) VT fuzed projectiles will not be fired over the heads of friendly troops unless specifically requested by the Battalion Commander.
 - (b) 5-inch SSR ammunition will not be fired over friendly lines unless specifically requested by the Battalion Commander. If requested, troops concerned will watch for burnouts in rockets which will cause short rounds
 - (c) Ships will maneuver as necessary to obtain a favorable gun-target line.
 - (d) Creep method of spotting will be used in all danger/danger close missions.
12. Target locations will be identified by the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid reference system.
13. Target numbers are assigned as follows:
 - FSCC - 11 thru 99
 - Spot Team A - 101 thru 149
 - Spot Team B - 151 thru 199
 - Spot Team C - 201 thru 249
 - Spot Team D - 251 thru 299If target number block becomes full, a new block will be assigned to the spotter by the NGLO.

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SECRET-NOFORN4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Ammunition loading and resupply in accordance with ref (a)
- b. Reports - PEPPER report will be given when reporting and at 0900 each succeeding day. The following ammunition codes will be used.

<u>TYPE AMMO</u>	<u>SIZE AMMO</u>
1 - AAC	3"50 - TUCKER
2 - AP	5"38 - RICKENBACKER
3 - AP(INERT)	5"54 - MARMON
4 - BL&P/BL&T	6"47 - DURANT
5 - COMMON	8"55 - DURANT
6 - HC	5"SSR - STANLEY STEAMER
7 - ILLUM	REDUCED CHARGE - MERCEDES
8 - VT	
9 - VENF	
10 - W	
11 - WP	

5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS (ELECTRONICS)

- a. NCF Communications IAW Tab 3 (NCF COMM) to this Appendix.
- b. SACC located aboard flagship, USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
- c. FSCC located at BLT 1/26 Command Post in the field.

TABS:

- A - Naval Gunfire Support Operations Diagram
- B - D-Day Schedule of Fires
- C - Naval Gunfire Communications Plan



A. A. MONTI


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RLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
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Tab A Naval Gunfire Operations Diagram to Appendix 2
 (Naval Gunfire Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination)



REF. POINTS

GRID COORDINATES

FSA I	A	290805
	B	318805
	C	300770
	D	290780
FSA II	E	380740
	F	380690
	G	350710

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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire Support Coordination) to
Operation Order 328-67Ref: (a) Maps: AMS L7014, sheets 6342 I, 6342 II, 6442 I, 6442 III,
6442 IV (1:50,000)

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATIONa. Enemy Forces. Annex B (Intelligence)b. Friendly Forces

- (1) Air support will be provided by III MAF.
- (2) CTG 76.5 establishes TACC/TADC as appropriate, provides coordination and control of all aircraft which may be assigned to support operations, exercises air traffic control over all aircraft transiting the AOA.

2. MISSION. Conduct air operations in support of Landing Force.3. EXECUTIONa. Concept of Operations. Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).b. Coordinating Instructions

- (1) AOA defined as: YD 282772 west along southern boundary DMZ to NS Grid Line 16 then south to northern bank of SONG CAM LO/QUA VIET River then east to sea. Seaward AOA extends in 25 NM arc from YD 310735. Air space is land and sea AOA from zero feet to 25,000 feet.
- (2) Restrictive Fire Plans, if employed, will be in accordance with Annex E (Fire Support Coordination).
- (3) Control of air will be passed ashore when SLF chops to TFGOLF.
- (4) CAS aircraft will be under positive control of either a Forward Air Controller (FAC) or Tactical Air Coordinator Airborne (TAC(A)) at all times.
- (5) The Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM), Military Grid Reference six (6) digit system of coordinates will be used for target designation.

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- (6) Panels or a suitable substitute will be displayed prior to calling in air strikes to mark friendly front lines.
 - (7) All helicopters will be available for medical evacuation and logistics resupply as the situation permits. Medical evacuation requests will be given a priority precedence. If casualty is in grave condition, emergency precedence will be used.
 - (8) Attack aircraft will be on station during landings to provide suppression fires, CAS, helicopter escort, and HLZ preparation as required.
 - (9) Standard mission request forms for calling missions will be used.
 - (10) Helicopter landing zones see Annex C (Operation Overlay).
4. ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS. Annex I (Logistics).
 5. COMMAND AND COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS. Annex F (Communications-Electronics).



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TABS

- A - Aircraft Schedule
- B - Air Communications
- C - Air Frequency Plan
- D - Call Signs
- E - General Instructions

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966TAB B (Air Communications) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-671. GENERAL

a. Air Communications in accordance with this TAB and Annex F.

2. FREQUENCY PLAN

a. Air frequencies in accordance with TAB C and Annex F.

b. Net activation times will be promulgated by separate message.

3. CALL SIGNS

a. Call signs in accordance with TAB D, Annex F, and JANAP 119F.

b. Aircraft tactical voice call signs will be derived from squadron call sign, flight number, and flight position.

EXAMPLE: Event 2 call signs

	First Flight	Second Flight
Flight Leader	Old Nick 1-1	Old Nick 2-1
Second Plane	Old Nick 1-2	Old Nick 2-2
Third Plane	Old Nick 1-3	Old Nick 2-3

4. AUTHENTICATION AND NUMERICAL CODES

a. Authentication and Numeral Codes in accordance with annex F.

b. Zulu time will be used for authentication and numeral codes.

5. RECOGNITION

a. IFF/SIF in accordance with appropriate CINCPACFLT Instructions as indicated below:

AIRCRAFT

Strike and Air Support

MODE 3/CODE

Code 13 15 16

E-3-B-1

SECRET-NOFORN

SECRET-NOFORN

RECOGNITION (Con't)

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MODE 3/CODE</u>
Helo	Code 10 17
Recon	Code 34
Troop Carrier and Itinerant	Code 20
Emergency	Code 77

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3

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

TAB C (Air Frequency Plan) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
 (Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-67

LEGEND

- C - Net Control Station
- W - When Directed or Required
- X - Guard
- L - Listen

	COLOR	FREQ	EMIS- SION NET	CRT
TACC				
HDC				
LPH				
HELO'S				
HELO ESCORT				
CAS A/C				
AIR BASES				
TAC'S				
TAC(A)/TAO				

	3A3J TAC(P)	3A3J TAC(S)	3A3J TAP/HP(P)	3A3J TAP/HP(S)	6A3 TATC/IATC(P)	6A3 TATC/IATC(S)	6A3 TAD(AC)-1	6A3 TAD(AC)-2	6A3 HD(HC)-1	6A3 HD(HC)-2	6A3 TAO(ARC)-1(?)	6A3 TAO(ARC)-2(S)	6A3 HeLo CMN	6A3 LPH L/L	6A3 SAR
TACC	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C			
HDC			X	W											
LPH													X	C	W
HELO'S					W	W			X	W	W	W	W	W	W
HELO ESCORT					W	W	W	W	X	W	W	W		W	W
CAS A/C					W	W	W	W			W	W			W
AIR BASES	X	W													
TAC'S			X	W			X	W							
TAC(A)/TAO							X	W			W	W			

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966TAB D (Call Signs) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E (Fire
Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-67TACC
HDC
CTG 76.5
CTU 76.5.1
CTU 76.5.2
CTG 79.5
LPH-2 USS IWO JIMA
LSD-28 USS THOMASTON
LPD-2 USS VANCOUVER
DASCICEPACK
FAIRMONT
COMPANY STORE
AZALEA BLOSSOM
LITERARY
HEARSAY
CROSS WALK
COCKTAIL GOLF
SNOW CHIEF
LAND SHARK BRAVOHMM 363
TACP
FAC'S
BLT 1-26
TAC (A)DINBAR
GLIMMER 14
GLIMMER 14C, D
GLIMMER
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USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
140800H August 1966

TAB E (General Instructions) to Appendix 3 (Air Support) to Annex E
(Fire Support Coordination) to Operation Order 328-67

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTION.

- a. All inbound aircraft will report to their controlling agency on the net assigned when over the specified control point.
- b. Aircraft assigned an "as directed" entry point and altitude will contact their controlling agency as soon as possible after take-off and proceed in accordance with instructions.
- c. Communications in accordance with TAB C.
- d. Aircraft reporting inbound will give the following information:
 - (1) Voice call of flight leader.
 - (2) Event number
 - (3) Number and type of aircraft
 - (4) Position and Altitude
 - (5) Estimated time of departure
 - (6) Ordnance load
- e. Assault helos on ship-to-shore movement in accordance with Annex D (Landing Plan).

2. CONTROL POINTS

- a. Aircraft entry and exit point AARON is 327 degrees 36 NM HUE tacan, Chan 69, Ident HUE.
 - b. Aircraft orbit point NORTH PLATTE is Island at YD 315665.
3. SEARCH AND RESCUE REFERENCE POINT. The SAR reference point is the USS IWO JIMA, Tacan Chan 20, Indent MY.



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③

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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800Z September 1966

Annex F (Communications-Electronics) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: (a) FMFPacO FO2000.2C
 (b) BnO 2000.1

Time Zone: H

1. SITUATION

a. Enemy Forces.

- (1) See Annex B (Intelligence).
- (2) See current ISUMS.
- (3) The enemy has the capability to:
 - (a) Intercept, jam, or employ imitative deception on any communication circuit.
 - (b) Cut or tap wire lines for purpose of interception or deception.
 - (c) Ambush wire teams during initial wire installation and trouble shooting missions.

b. Friendly Forces.

- (1) See Annex A (Task Organization).
- (2) Command Posts

(a) Afloat

1. CTG 79.5	LPH-2
2. BLT 1/26	LPH-2
3. Co A	LPD-2
4. Co B	LPH-2
5. Co C	LPD-2
6. Co D	LPH-2

F-1

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- | | |
|------------------------------|--------|
| 7. Btry A 1/13 | LSD-28 |
| 8. 107mm Mortar Btry 2/12 | LPH-2 |
| 9. 1st Plt Co A, 5th Tk Bn | LSD-28 |
| 10. 1st Plt Co A, 5th Amtrac | LPD-2 |
| 11. 1st Plt Co A, 5th AT BN | LPD-2 |

(b) Ashore

1. BLT 1/26 To be announced.

- (3) Subordinate units report C. P. locations when established.
2. MISSION. Provide communications and electronics support for the BLT in the amphibious operation and subsequent operations ashore.
3. EXECUTION.
- a. Communications Platoon BLT 1/26
- (1) Guard CLF Tact Net # 1 commencing H-1.
 - (2) Guard CLF Tact Net # 2 commencing H-1.
 - (3) Be prepared to augment organic and attached units with FM radio equipment.
 - (4) Be prepared to provide the following equipment and personnel for operation of the BLT TACLOG aboard the LPH.
 - (a) One radio set AN/PRC - 25
 - (b) Four radio operators
 - (5) Provide message center service for BLT elements embarked aboard the LPH.
- b. Air Support Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).
- c. Shore Party Communications. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan).

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SECRET NOFORN

d. Coordinating Instructions.

- (1) References (a) and (b).
- (2) Messenger Service
 - (a) Helicopter messenger between BLT command Post ashore and the LPH will be announced.
- (3) Radio
 - (a) Radio Nets. See Appendix 1 (Radio & Frequency Plan)
 - (b) Call Signs. See Appendix 2 (Call Signs)
 - (c) Check in and guard assigned radio nets at H-1 on D-Day.
 - (d) Attached units will enter the BLT Tactical Net when other means of communications with this headquarters fail.
 - (e) Radio checks and test counts will be held to an absolute minimum.
 - (f) All stations will tune to Net Control Station.
 - (g) All used dry cell batteries will be returned to this headquarters for disposal.
 - (h) Immediately report to this Headquarters by other means, known or suspected enemy interference, imitative deception or jamming.
 - (i) Local time will be used on all messages transmitted within the BLT.
- (4) Wire
 - (a) Telephone directory and switchboard names in accordance with Reference (b).
 - (b) All wire lines will be retrieved when departing a position or when leaving the objective area under all circumstances.
 - (c) Whenever a wire team leaves the BLT C.P., they will be accompanied by a fire team to be furnished by C.P. security elements.

SECRET NOFORN

(d) There will be no trouble shooting of wire lines, external of the BLT C.P. after dusk, except as directed by the Communications Officer.

(e) Radio Relay. See Appendix 4 (Radio Relay).

(5) Visual Communications. See Appendix 3 (Visual Communications).

(6) Cryptographic Operations.

(a) Coordinates will be concealed in accordance with Annex K. (Check Points)

(b) See ref (b) Para 501 and 502 for instructions on Authentication and coupling.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. See Annex I (Logistics).

b. Dry cell batteries and wire will be replenished on a daily requested basis by the BLT Supply Officer. All units will carry the following initial supply to operate for 24 hours.

WIRE -----	As required.
BA-30 -----	As required.
BA-386 -----	Two(2) per AN/PRC-25.
BB-451 -----	Two(2) per AN/PRC-41/47.

c. BB-451 battery charging facilities will be maintained aboard the LPH. Replenishment will be on a one-for-one basis. Users will tag the battery being sent in for recharging. The users identity and location will be on the tag. Example: FAC #2 - Co"A".

d. Second and limited third echelon maintenance will be available aboard the LPH. A limited second echelon maintenance capability will exist ashore.

e. The BLT Communications Officer must be notified of equipment failure and whether or not a replacement is necessary. All evacuated equipment must be tagged by the user indicating the type of trouble, and accompanied by an individual.

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SECRET NOFORN

3

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- f. A limited replacement float of communication equipment is available aboard the LPD and, when announced, ashore in the objective area.
- g. All communications equipment will have preventive maintenance accomplished on a continuous basis.
- h. Communication equipment will be waterproofed prior to the landing, when crossing rivers and during rainy weather.


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APPENDIXES:

- 1 - Radio & Frequency Plan
- 2 - Call Signs
- 3 - Visual Communications
- 4 - Radio Relay

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Red Charlie
Blue Delta
Orange Golf
Green Hotel

1. LEGEND

C- Net Control
X- Guard
O- Be prepared to enter as directed or required.

	81mm CoF Fire	32.4	M-426
	Arty CoF Fire (P)	34.2	M-432
	Arty CoF Fire (S)	35.05	M-58
	TACP Local	56.6	M-43
	TAB/HR (P)	43.95	H-3
	TAB/HR (S)	93.67	H-4
	TAD -1	312.2	H-7
	TAD -2	315.4	H-8
	HD-1	226.6	H-11
	HD-2	268.2	H-12
	NGF Control	317.9	O-3
	NGF Spot (P)	41.0	C-5A
	NGF Spot (S)	43.01	C-5B
	SFCP Local	39.2	M-26
	RR (BLT) (P) (T)	67.6	M-52
	RR (BLT) (P) (R)	57.4	M-60
BLT 1/26 (FSCC)	X	C	C
BLT 1/26			
81mm Mortar	C		
107mm Mortar	X	O	
Btry A/1/13	X	O	
FAC		X	X
NGF Spot		X	O
Tank Plt	X	O	

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BLT 1/26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H SEPTEMBER 1966APPENDIX 2 (CALL SIGNS) TO ANNEX F (COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS)
TO OPERATION ORDER 328-67

CTG 79.5	HEARSAY
CTG 79.5 LIASON	HEARSAY TWO FOUR
TG 79.5	POSITIVE
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	CROSS WALK
USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2)	SNOW CHIEF
USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)	COCKTAIL GOLF
HMM 363	DUNBAR
BLT 1/26	GLIMMER
BLT 1/26 REAR	GLIMMER REAR
BLT COLLECTIVE	INVESTMENT
CO A	GLIMMER ALFA
CO B	GLIMMER BRAVO
CO C	GLIMMER CHARLIE
CO D	GLIMMER DELTA
PROVISIONAL CO	GLIMMER NOVEMBER
H&S CO	GLIMMER YANKEE
81MM MORTAR PLT	GLIMMER WHISKEY
106MM RR PLT	GLIMMER TANGO
FLAME SEC	GLIMMER FOX TROT
FSCC	GLIMMER BAILEY
NGF LN O	GLIMMER TWO SIX OSCAR
NGF SPOT TM	GLIMMER TWO SIX CHARLIE
NGF SPOT #3 TM #1	GERTRUDE TWO SIX ALFA
NGF SPOT #3 TM #2	GERTRUDE TWO SIX BRAVO
ALO	GLIMMER ONE FOUR
FAC #1	GLIMMER ONE FOUR ALFA
FAC #2	GLIMMER ONE FOUR BRAVO
BLT TACLOG (LPH-2)	GLIMMER PRODUCT
TACLOG (LPD-2)	GLIMMER PRODUCT ONE
TACLOG (LSD-28)	GLIMMER PRODUCT TWO
A BTRY, 1/13	KALAMAZOO
107MM MORTAR BTRY	HENPECKED
1/A/5TH AMTRAC BN	CHUSCH HILL
1/A/5TH AT BN	FOOLS CAP
1/A/5TH ENGR BN	GRUB WORM

F-2-1

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3

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1/A/5TH TANK BN
 1/A/5TH MT BN
 FORCE RECON PLT
 DIV RECON
 HST

COWGIRL
 BOOBY TRAP
 GREEN THUMB
 FLOOD TIDE
 EMBANKMENT (LZ NAME OR COMPANY
 ATTACHED TO)

TACTICAL AIR OBSERVER
 SHORE PARTY
 4TH MARINES
 1ST BN 4TH MAR
 2D BN 4TH MAR
 3D BN 4TH MAR
 2ND BN 7TH MAR
 2D BN 9TH MAR
 3D BN 12TH MAR

HEARSAY PLAYBOY
 LUCKY BAG
 SCAT
 PERMISSION
 RIDGEBEAM
 MUTTER
 COUNTY FAIR
 PILSNER
 POLISH



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BLT 1/26
USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966Appendix 3 (Visual Communications) to Annex F (Communications-Elec-
tronics) to Operation Order 328-67

1. Smoke Signals Will Be As Follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Signal, Ground, Yellow Smoke, M-64 or Grenade, Rifle, Yellow Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Yellow Smoke	Marking of the friendly unit's position or of a secured area for an urgent or normal aircraft landing.
Signal, Ground, Green Smoke M-65 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke M-18 or Grenade, Rifle, Green Smoke	Please inform us of the enemy direction or position.
Grenade, Rifle, Red Smoke or Grenade, Hand, Red Smoke (When dropped by A/C)	Marking of the enemy position.
Grenade, Hand, Smoke, HC (White)	Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.

2. Illumination Signals Will be as Follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>MEANING</u>
Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (One signal is fired)	Encircled or attacked by the enemy. Request support. Type of support must be affirmed by radio.
Signal, Ground, Red Star Cluster (Cont, firing of three or more signal)	Request for emergency illumination (Radio Liaison must be established)
Signal, Ground, Green Star M-125 (Hand held)	Request for helo-evacuation.
Signal, Ground, White Star AMN-44A1 or Signal, Ground, White Star Parachute M-127 (Hand held)	Radio Breakdown.

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Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster (Fire 1 signal)	Request for radio communications on the air-ground frequency.

Signal, Ground, White Star Cluster (Cont. firing of three or more signal)	Request cease firing illumination.

Signal, Ground, Red Star Parachute M-126 (Hand held)	We are withdrawing from this position.

3. Panel Signals Will Be As Follows:

a. Helo Landing Point Identification

(1) Where ever possible all landing zones will be marked with an "x" formed by using two panels from either Panel Set AP-30C or AP-30D. The color selected will contrast with the landing point in order to be easily recognized by aircraft. Rifle companies will further identify by using a display showing their respective unit letter designation.

(a) EXAMPLE: Company "A"

(2) Prevailing wind direction will be shown by installing a short pole (about 3 feet) with streamers, flag or pennant of sufficient length to permit the pilot to determine the local wind.

(3) Night marking of helicopter landing points, when tactically feasible, may consist of three flashlights placed at the apex of a triangle or vehicle lights flashed from downwind of the landing point and illuminating the landing area.

(4) Front Line Marking. Marking of friendly front lines will be by use of Panels VS-4/U (Red) placed parallel to the front lines.



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F-3-2


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BLT 1-26
USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966

Appendix 4 (Radio Relay) to Annex F (Communications-Electronics)
to Operation Order 328-67.

FROM CTG 79.5



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PLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966

Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-67

Time Zone: H

Ref: None

1. GENERAL. This Annex contains instruction for the submission of Operational Reports by Subordinate Units of the PLT.

2. REPORTS REQUIRED.

<u>REPORTS</u>	<u>FFOM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
a. SITREP	All Units	S-3	Commencing at H plus 3 covering previous 3 hrs and every 6 hrs thereafter	Appendix 1 All activity and contacts to be reported in detail BnO 3040.1 Any Significant Item
b. CASUALTY REPORTS	All Units	S-1	As Occuring	Appendix 2
c. SPOT REPORTS	All Units	S-2/ S-3	As Occuring	
d. MAJOR ORDNANCE/EQNR EQUIPMENT LOSS/DAMAGE AGE REPORT	All Units	S-4	As Occuring	
e. JAMMING	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	CG FMFPAC Order P03000.5A A - Patrol Designation B - Size and Type C - Route and Check Points D - Time Out E - Time In F - Information Collected
f. OPSTAT	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	
g. CHANGE OF LINES	All Units	S-3	As Occuring	
h. SHEL/MORT REP	All Units	S-2	As Occuring	
i. PATROL REPORTS	All Units	S-3/ S-2	As Occuring	

G-1

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<u>REPORTS</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>TIME</u>	<u>REFERENCE</u>
j. OP LOCATIONS	All Units	S-2	As Occuring	A - Designation of OP B - Coordinates C - Azimuth of Sector of Observation D - Time Coened E - Size and Type
k. LOGISTIC SUMMARY REPORT	Shore Party	S-4	D-day submit every 6 hrs from D+1 submit at 1800 as of 1600	
l. MUSTER REPORTS	All Units	S-1	Upon re-embarkation after Ops Ashore	Message Report
m. REPORT OF SUPPLIES EXPENDED	All Units	S-4	3 days after completion of Ops	Message Report



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APPENDIX:

1. SITREP
2. Major Ordnance/Engr Equip Loss/Damage Report
3. SPOTREP Format

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BLM 1-26

US. ICG JICA (LAD-2)

110800H September 1966

Appendix 1 (SIRREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation
Order 328-07

Time Zone: H

SIRREP (Number)

- A. ENEMY UNITS IN CONTACT
- B. ENEMY ACTIVITY DURING PERIOD
- C. CP LOCATION
- D. FRONT LINES AND BOUNDARIES
- E. SCHEME OF MANUEVER
- F. PATROLS (Size, type, route) See Note 5.
- G. AMBUSHES (Size, location) See Note 5.
- H. COMBAT EFFICIENCY
- I. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS
- J. SUPPORTING ARMS (Air, NGF, Arty, Mortar and number of missions each)
- K. OWN STRENGTH (MARINE OFF, MARINE ENL, NAV OFF, NAV ENL)
- L. CASUALTIES (KIA)
- M. CASUALTIES (WIA)
- N. CASUALTIES (Non-battle)
- O. MIA
- P. ENEMY CASUALTIES (Body count, Est KIA, Est WIA) (Send Clear)
- Q. ENEMY CAPTIVES (Send Clear)
- R. STATUS OF SUPPLIES
- S. EQUIPMENT OUT OF ACTION (What and why)
- T. CAPTURED MATERIAL (What, amount, and where)
- U. CIVIC ACTION (Brief description)

G-1-1


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V. INTENTIONS

W. UNUSUAL EVENTS

- Note: (1) If no change from previous report or an item is not applicable, omit. Do not send negative or none.
- (2) Refer to friendly positions by check point system.
- (3) Use NUCO for all friendly personnel figures k through o.
- (4) Use NUCO for Item R.
- (5) Designate size of patrols and ambushes by the following code in the clear: Flt (1), Sqd (2), Fireteam (3). EXAMPLE: Size (1).



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
G-1-2

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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966Appendix 2 (Major Ordnance/Engineer Equipment Loss/Damage Reports) to
Annex G (Reports) to Operation Order 328-67

Time Zone: H

1. Report Title: Equipment Casualty Report
2. Format: Message
 - a. Item description.
 - b. Coordinates where lost/damaged.
 - c. DTG of occurrence.
 - d. Extent of damage.
 - e. Circumstances concerning incident.
 - f. Replacement required (yes or no.).
3. Frequency: As occurring.
4. Submitted by: Unit concerned.
5. Submitted to: BLT 1-26


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SECRET-NOFORNBLT 1-26
USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
110800H September 1966Appendix 3 (SPOTREP Format) to Annex G (Reports) to Operation
Order 328-67

SPOTREP

- A. Source of Information
- B. Time of Incident
- C. Location of Incident
- D. Complete Description of Incident. Give all Details
- E. Describe Action Taken
- F. Friendly KIA
- G. Friendly WIA
- H. Friendly MIA
- I. Enemy KIA
- J. Enemy WIA
- K. Enemy VCC
- L. Enemy VCS
- M. Weapons and Ammo Captured
- N. Documents and Equipment Captured

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Battalion Landing Team 1/26
 USS IWO JIMA
 090200H September 1966

ANNEX I (Logistics) to Operation Order 328-67

- Ref: (a) Administrative Order 4-66
 (b) BnO 4000.2 SOP for Tac-Log Party
 (c) BnO 8000.4 Class V Accountability
 (d) Bn Memorandum dtd 4 Sept 66 Supply Economy
 (e) BnBul 8000 dtd 31 Aug 1966 Handling of Class V Items

Time Zone: H

1. SUPPLY

a. General. Supplies to be landed will be the minimum required to accomplish the mission.

(1) Supply Concept. Helicopters will be the primary means of delivering supplies ashore. Most deliveries will be direct from ships to the using units.

(2) Contingency Reserve. To guard against the effects of inclement weather, other operational requirements, and unforeseen circumstances, a contingency reserve will be positioned ashore on order of the Battalion Landing Team Commander. Normally this level of supply will not exceed two days.

b. Supply Sources. Sources of all classes of supply are as designated.

<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Alternate</u>
Class I	USS IWO JIMA	USS VANCOUVER
*Class II	USS VANCOUVER	
Class III	USS VANCOUVER	USS THOMASTON
Class IV	USS VANCOUVER	
Class V	USS IWO JIMA	USS VANCOUVER
*Type II Supplies only		

c. Preparation and Staging of Supplies

(1) Supplies will be prepared and staged aboard assigned ships and ready for loading either for helicopter or surface craft on D-1. Thereafter, supplies will be prepared in anticipation of the next days operations

(2) Embarkation Officers and ships' platoons have the responsibility of preparing and staging of supplies as directed by Tac-Log. Refer to reference (b) for Tac-Log operations.

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d. Prescribed Load. Prescribed loads are in accordance with reference (a) and as modified below.

(1) Class I - Meal Combat Individual with fuel trioxane-
 Four meals will be issued for D-Day. Thereafter 3 meals/day.

(2) Class II - Essential T/E, T/A items as determined by
 unit commanders. Individual body armor or gas masks to be included
 upon order of the Battalion Landing Team Commander.

(3) Class III - For vehicles designated to go ashore, full
 gas tanks. Minimum one expeditionary gas can full per vehicle.

(4) Class IV - As determined by unit commanders from assets
 held.

(5) Class V - Basic Allowance. Items are to be prepared
 and staged prior to D-day but not issued until the morning of
 D-day.

(6) Water - Two full canteens/individual. Filled water cans
 on the basis of $\frac{1}{2}$ gallon/individual. Unit commanders coordinate
 with embarkation officers to prepare and stage water cans on D-1.

(7) Medical - Unit commanders insure salt tablets and
 halazone tablets are available to each individual.

e. Supplies and Equipment Available. Refer to reference (a).

f. Control and Distribution.

(1) Tac-Log

(a) The Tac-Log Party will be established aboard the
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2) and will function in accordance with reference (b).

(b) The Tac-Log Party will consist of the following
 representatives:

Battalion Landing Team S-4 Representative
 (Tac-Log Officer)
 Battalion Landing Team Embarkation Officer
 Battalion Landing Team S-3 Representative
 Two radio operators

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(c) The embarkation officers of each ship will act as alternate Tac-Log Parties aboard their respective ships.

(d) The Tac-Log Officer will record all supplies moved ashore.

(2) Units will request "EXPRESS" Automatic Resupply Shipments directly from Tac-Log. Refer to Appendix 1 to this Annex. Shipment will be made directly to requesting unit. In the event of communications failure, request express shipments thru the Battalion Landing Team S-4 by the most expeditious means.

(3) Units will request "BUYERS CHOICE" Selective Item Resupply, thru the Battalion Landing Team S-4. The Battalion Landing Team S-4 will contact Tac-Log regarding the delivery of supplies. Refer to Appendix 1 and 2 of Annex I to Operation Order 328-67.

(4) Unit commanders will report the delivery of supplies to this Headquarters (BLT S-4). Tac-Log will be informed and in turn, will notify CTG 79.5.

(5) Unit commanders will record Class II supplies expended and upon termination of the operation, submit listings of items expended. The Battalion Landing Team S-4 will record the expenditures for the operation. CTG 79.5 will be notified.

(6) Levels of supply in the hands of using units in the objective area will not exceed one (1) day of supply for any class.

(7) Every effort will be made to safeguard supplies against damage, pilferage, or waste.

(8) Prior to reembarkation, unit commanders will insure Class V items to be recovered are free of dirt and rust. Recovery points and procedures will be established by Embarkation Officers for their respective ships.

2. EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. General

(1) Sanitation and Preventative Medicine

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(a) The tropical climate and heavy rainfall in the operating area create special medical problems. Chief among these are heat exhaustion and tropical diseases. Foot infections from prolonged immersion in water is a distinct hazard. Use of local water or food products is prohibited.

(b) Unit commanders will ensure maximum sanitary discipline under combat conditions.

b. Evacuation

(1) Movement

(a) Casualties requiring evacuation occurring in landing craft or helicopters will remain aboard if possible and be returned to medical facilities afloat. First Aid or Buddy Aid will be rendered whenever practical.

(2) Assault

(a) Casualties occurring ashore will be evacuated directly to the LPH by helicopter.

(b) Surface means will be used if practical.

(3) Casualty Evacuation Control

(a) The LPH is designated the Casualty Evacuation Control Ship (CECS).

(b) A medical officer on the LPH will be designated as the Casualty Evacuation Control Officer (CECO).

(4) Casualty Classification, Treatment, and Evacuation Policy

(a) Casualties will be classified and treated in the following order:

1 Minimal: Those requiring minimal treatment to be fit for duty.

2 Immediate: Those requiring immediate treatment to save life or limb.

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3 Delayed: Those capable of having treatment delayed for a period of up to 12 hours without hazard to life or limb.

4 Expectant: Those which are moribund or who cannot reasonably be expected to survive with treatment.

(b) Casualties will be reclassified as condition indicates.

(c) Casualties classified as minimal may be used to the extent practicable to assist in collection and evacuation of other casualties.

(d) Casualties will be evacuated in the following order of priority:

<u>TYPE CASUALTY</u>	<u>EVACUATION PRIORITY</u>
<u>1</u> Immediate	Emergency
<u>2</u> Delayed	Priority
<u>3</u> Minimal	ASAP
<u>4</u> Expectant	ASAF

3. TRANSPORTATION

a. Land. The landing of wheeled and track vehicles will be restricted to those required for accomplishment of the mission. Specific vehicles will be designated at the time determined.

4. SERVICE

a. Functions

(1) Construction. As required

(2) Maintenance - To be provided by the appropriate service attachment to the Battalion Landing Team. Maximum use will be made of contact teams and end-item replacement.

5. PERSONNEL

a. Strengths

(1) All units will debark with strengths required to provide maximum combat efficiency.

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b. Replacements

(1) None available from sources outside the Battalion Landing Team.

(2) Notify the Battalion Landing Team S-1 by the most expeditious means feasible in the event of casualties to key personnel seriously affecting the mission.

c. Discipline, Law and Order

(1) Battalion Standing Operating Procedures in effect.

(2) Minor infractions to be deferred until after operation. Serious incidents and infractions will be reported immediately.

(3) Straggler control by the Battalion Landing Team S-1 when the battalion CP is established ashore.

d. Captives

(1) All provisions of the Geneva Convention will be observed.

(2) Units apprehending captives will handle and process them to designated collection point in accordance with Annex B (Intelligence) to this Operation Order.

(3) Location and opening of collection point to be announced.

(4) Disposition of captives by the Battalion Landing Team S-1 will be as directed by CTG 79.5 or other competent higher authority.

(5) The Headquarters Commandant will provide suitable guards as requested by the Battalion Landing Team S-1.

e. Morale and Personnel Services

(1) Medals and Awards. Recommendations submitted to this Headquarters (BLT S-1) in accordance with the provisions of SECNAVINST P1640.1C, FMFPAC Order 1650.1A and 9th MAB Order 1650.1.

(2) Postal

(a) Free mailing privileges will prevail.

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(b) Pickup and delivery of mail will be arranged by the Battalion Landing Team Postal Officer.

(3) Exchange Service

(a) Afloat - Ships Store.

(b) Ashore - None.

(4) Information

(a) All troops to receive indoctrination prior to D-Day. Refer to current landing force information and education material.

(b) Unit commanders keep troops informed of current news and Battalion Landing Team progress as appropriate.

f. Personnel Procedures

(1) Personnel Summary and Casualty reports in accordance with Battalion Order 3040.1A and Appendix 1 (SITREP) to Annex G (Reports) to this Operation Order.

(2) Battalion Administrative Center to commence operating aboard the LPH effective D-1 and to remain in operation until secured by competent authority.

6. MISCELLANEOUS

a. Security of all supplies, equipment and personal effects while aboard ships is the responsibility of embarked commanders.

b. When helicopters are used for logistic support, maximum utilization of space should be attained for the trip, both to and from the LPH.

c. All material requiring salvage will be reported and returned to amphibious shipping by the most expeditious means.

d. No materials of potential use to the enemy will be left unguarded or discarded.

e. All captured material will be evacuated for evaluation.

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f. Units will report type, quantity, condition, location, time and date of all captured material.

g. Use of captured material is prohibited unless approved by this Headquarters.

h. Deadlined equipment will be reported immediately to this Headquarters (BLT S-4).

i. Uniform and Equipment for Debarkation

(1) Utilities with boots

(2) Helmet (green side out)

(3) T/O weapon with corresponding belt, pocket or pouch, two canteens, first aid kit, suspenders, and holster as appropriate.

(4) Individual equipment as appropriate, i.e., compass, k-bar, binoculars, whistles, grenade launchers, etc.

(5) Haversack, poncho, and entrenching tool.

j. Supply economy will be stressed in accordance with reference (d).

k. Class V items will be handled and accounted for in accordance with reference (c) and (e).


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Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps
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APPENDIX

1 - Resupply Requisitioning and Shipment

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Appendix 1 (Resupply Requisitioning and Shipment Code) to Annex I (Logistic) to Operation Order 328-67

Time Zone: Hotel (-0)

RESUPPLY REQUISITIONING AND SHIPMENT CODE *

AUTOMATIC RESUPPLY

SELECTIVE RESUPPLY

REQUISITION CODE: "EXPRESS"		REQUISITION CODE: "BUYER'S CHOICE"	
SHIPMENT CLASS	DOA	SHIPMENT CLASS	REMARKS
SUPPLY	DOS	CODE	ORDER AS APPROPRIATE
I	1	ALFA	I 1,2, or 3 meals/man/unit Water at 1/2 gal/man
II	1	BRAVO	II Items and quantity as required
		CHARLIE	III "
		DELTA	IV "
III	1	ECHO	V "

* NOTE: (1) Regardless of type shipment requested, the helicopter request must be submitted designating the time and place of delivery. In the event either of these items are unknown, the helicopter request will be submitted in anticipation of the requirement with the understanding the unknowns will be provided before delivery. For the sake of guidelines, the helicopter request must be submitted the day before the requirement. (2) It must also be recognized that the terms "EXPRESS" or "BUYER'S CHOICE" have nothing to do with the speed of delivery. Speed or priority of delivery will be based upon the units requirement, taken into consideration with transportation means available and the landing Force's overall requirement. Speed of requirements may be stated in Block 3 (Emergency, Priority, ASAP, Routine) and Block 4 (Date/Time Required) of the Helicopter Request Form. (3) In ordering Express shipments, order only the Class of supply desired. "ALL" are not automatic. Only the amounts within each supply category.

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Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps
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BLT 1-26
 USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)
 110800H September 1966

Annex J (Rules of Engagement) to Operation Order 328-67

Ref: (a) COMUSMACV Directive Number 95-2, 20 December 1965
 (b) COMUSMACV msg O 261030Z Dec 65
 (c) SLF Operation Order 328-67

Time Zone: H

1. GENERAL

- a. Nothing shall infringe on the inherent right of the individual Marine to defend himself against attack. In the event of attack, the individual concerned may take immediate aggressive action against the attacking force by any means available.
- b. In order to avoid embittering the Vietnamese population against U.S. Forces in VIETNAM, unit commanders must avoid the use of unnecessary force leading to non-combatant battle casualties.
- c. Maximum use will be made of competent Vietnamese (VN liaison personnel) during the conduct of operations in order to provide identification of friendly forces and as a means of contact and identification of civilians.

2. MINIMIZING NON-COMBATANT CASUALTIES. Unit Commanders will hold troop indoctrination briefings prior to the operation to emphasize the importance of minimizing non-combatant casualties and conduct operations in accordance with the following guidelines:

- a. In cases where defensive fire is undertaken, care will be exercised to ensure that friendly or innocent personnel are not endangered.
- b. In situations where light small arms fire is received from a populated area, every effort will be made to identify the exact target before engagement.
- c. The proper selection of landing zones, the careful planning and execution of air strikes, and the proper employment of artillery and armed helicopters will avoid unnecessary damage to lives and property of non-combatants.
- d. Forward air controllers and Shore Fire Control Parties will be briefed by Unit Commanders on areas to be avoided due to the presence of a friendly or potentially friendly population.
- e. Use of riot control agents CS and CN may be employed in appropriate situations. Prior approval by the BLT Commander is required.

SECRET-NOFORN3. SAFE GUARDING OF VIETNAMESE PROPERTY AND FOOD SUPPLIES

- a. Marines engaged in search and destroy operations will take all practicable measures to minimize the destruction of Vietnamese property. The destruction of dwellings and livestock by U. S. Forces as a denial measure is prohibited. Such actions must be performed by RVNAF Units.
- b. Requests by Vietnamese authorities for employment of U.S. Forces to destroy Vietnamese property, including livestock, will be referred to the BLT Commander.
- c. Large food caches discovered or captured will be reported to the BLT CP for extraction and redistribution by local GVN officials.

4. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

- a. Unit commanders will instruct troops to fire only under the following circumstances:
 - (1) When they observe and identify a person or persons as enemy.
 - (2) When fire is being delivered on friendly troops.
 - (3) When personnel are attempting, by hasty or suspicious acts, obviously to avoid contact with friendly troops.
 - (4) When requested to fire by friendly RVNAF commanders after approval from the BLT Commander.
- b. Artillery and naval gunfire missions are authorized to be conducted in accordance with the following:
 - (1) In areas exclusive of villages and hamlets, artillery fire and naval gunfire may be directed against enemy forces in accordance with normal fire direction procedures.
 - (2) Unobserved artillery fire will be employed only in cases where requested missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather, or when no U. S. TAC(A), TAO is available and then only if targets declared hostile by GVN or VN liaison personnel.
 - (3) Unobserved naval gunfire will be employed only in cases where requested missions cannot be observed due to terrain, weather, or when no U. S. TAC(A), TAO or SFCP is available and then only at targets declared hostile by GVN or VN liaison personnel. Use of naval gunfire in this manner will be employed only when absolutely required and will not be considered as normal procedure.
 - (4) Missions against known or suspected VC targets in hamlets and villages occupied by non-combatants will be conducted

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- (a) All fire missions on hamlets or villages will be controlled by a TAO(A) or a ground forward observer (FO) and will be executed only after GVN/PVNAF approval as appropriate. Approval will be requested through the BLT Commander.
 - (b) Hamlets or villages not associated with ground operations will not be attacked by gunfire without prior warning (by leaflets and/or speaker systems or other appropriate means) even though light fire is received from them. Instructions will be requested from the BLT CP under these circumstances.
 - (c) Hamlets and villages may be attacked without prior warning if the attack is in conjunction with a ground operation involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the ground commander, his mission would be jeopardized by such warning. If practical, approval to attack will be requested from the BLT Commander under these circumstances.
- c. Close air support missions are to be conducted in accordance with the following:
- (1) Strike aircraft will normally be controlled by a U. S. TAC(A), FAC, ALO, or TAO
 - (2) Under emergency conditions when none of the above means of controlling strike aircraft are available, the commander of a ground unit engaged with the enemy may designate the target for aircraft, except when the target is in a hamlet or village or when the target is not in a "SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONE". In such cases, the request to attack a village or hamlet with CAS will be made to the PLT Commander.
 - (3) Close air support missions that involve strikes on hamlets or villages will normally be controlled by an TAC(A) or TACP. Such an attack will be executed only after GVN and PVNAF approval as appropriate. It is the responsibility of the ground commander to request the air strike from the BLT Commander who will seek approval from the appropriate authority, and notify the ground commander of the decision. Hamlets or villages may be attacked by air without prior warning to the inhabitants if the attack is in conjunction with ground operations involving the movement of ground forces through the area and if, in the judgement of the BLT Commander, the mission would be jeopardized by such warning.
 - (4) The TAC(A) or TACP or other controllers of close air support missions will ensure that the positions of friendly troops are known and that the information is passed to the strike aircraft. When friendly troop positions are uncertain, the ground commander will

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be required to mark or otherwise identify his position prior to the strike. If time permits the controller will be briefed on the scheme of maneuver, and the friendly troops will be made aware of the time and place of the impending air strikes.

- (5) SPECIFIED STRIKE ZONES (Formerly referred to as FREE BOMB ZONES or FREE STRIKE ZONES) are defined as those areas where air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire may be conducted without further approval by the province chief.

5. CONDUCT OF LANDING FORCE PERSONNEL

- a. In order to win and maintain the support of the Vietnamese people in assisting U.S. Forces in the struggle against the VC and NVA forces, all troops will be indoctrinated in the following rules of conduct while ashore:
- (1) They are guests of the Vietnamese and should act as such.
 - (2) They should join with the people and try to help them in any way possible.
 - (3) They should make friends with their Vietnamese counterparts.
 - (4) They should be particularly polite to Vietnamese women and children.
 - (5) They should be alert at all times.
 - (6) They should give the Vietnamese the right of way whenever they are driving a vehicle.
 - (7) They should not be loud and boisterous.
 - (8) They should not ostentatiously show money when in the company of Vietnamese.
 - (9) They should reflect honor on themselves and their country, and at all times.



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Annex K (Checkpoints) to Operation Order 328-67

<u>CHECKPOINTS</u>	<u>GRID COORDINATES</u>
MONTHS	290730
DOGS	260680
GIRLS NAMES	230740
CITIES	210700
TREES	200640
FLOWERS	160720
CARS	140650
GRAIN	200670 200670

1. Locations will be described by using the checkpoint system. Forward (F) is always 0 degrees Grid. Back (B) is always 180 degrees Grid, Right (R) is always 90 degrees Grid, and left is always 270 degrees Grid, Meters will be given in 100's.

2. Use a name associated with the check point.

Example: Month - June
Dog - Beagle
Girls Names - Joan
Cities - Tulsa
Trees - Oak
Flower - Rose
Car - Ford
Grain - Wheat

3. All locations will be in the following format:

Name, F or B, Meters, L or P, Meters

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Annex Z (Distribution) to Operation Order 328-67

Time Zone: H

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>NO. OF COPIES</u>
CMC (Code AO3H)	2	CO, Co B, BLT 1-26	2
CINCPAC	1	CO, Co C, BLT 1-26	2
CG, FMFPac	1	CO, Co D, BLT 1-26	2
Dir, MCLFDC, MCS	1	CO, Btry A (Rein), 1stBn 13th Marines	2
COMSEVENTHFLT	1	CO, 107 Mortar Btry (Rein) 2 2nd Bn, 12th Marines	2
CG, IJJ MAF	1	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
CTF 76	7	5th Tank Bn, FMF	
CTF 79	1	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
CTG 76.5	4	5th Amtrac Bn, FMF	
CTG 79.5	6	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
CO USS IWO JIMA (LPH-2)	5	5th AT Bn	
CO USS THOMASTON (LSD-28)	3	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
CO USS VANCOUVER (LPD-2)	3	5th Engr Bn	
CO HM 363	5	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
CO, BLT 1-26	1	5th MT Bn	
XO, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plt (-) (Rein), 3rd	1
S-1, BLT 1-26	1	Force Recon Co, FMF	
S-2, BLT 1-26	1	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
S-3, BLT 1-26	4	5th Recon Bn	
S-4, BLT 1-26	2	1st Plt, (Rein), Co A,	1
CO, H&S Co, BLT 1-26	4	5th SP Bn	
CO, Co A, BLT 1-26	2	Logistic Support Unit	1
		Det, Beachmaster Unit,	1
		Naval Beach Group	
		S&C Files, BLT 1-26	12
		CommO, BLT 1-26	1
		MedO, BLT 1-26	1
		MFO, BLT 1-26	1
		SupO, BLT 1-26	1
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